Philippine Non-Metallic Minerals and Aggregates — Limestone, Cement, Gravel, Sea Sand, Marble

As of 2026-08-30 · Updated 2026-08-30 · Section: Mineral Resources · 日本語版

0. A 3-minute summary to read first

Philippine mining tends to conjure images of nickel, gold, and copper, but in reality, the side that cuts deepest into the domestic economy, local politics, and corruption structures is non-metallic minerals and aggregates.

1. 注 Terms to get straight first — "reserves" and "resources" are not the same thing

This is where articles on underground resources most often go wrong.

In the Philippine Statistics Authority's (PSA) Philippine Economic-Environmental and Natural Resources Accounting (PEENRA)-related compilations, limestone is put at roughly 58.66 billion tons of resources and roughly 2.31 billion tons of reserves, with the largest resources in Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) and the largest reserves in Region VII (Central Visayas) (per PSA/MGB-related materials). Even for the same material, "limestone," resources and reserves differ by a factor of more than 25.

注 Figures such as "29 billion tons of limestone reserves, 57% of non-metallic reserves" and "8.5 billion tons of marble, 16.7%" circulate widely online, but these are secondary information with unclear sourcing and base years. They do not match the PSA-related figures (58.66 billion / 2.31 billion) above. Which figure you cite changes the story, so always specify whether it is resources or reserves, and where it comes from.

注 An even more important point: the figures for the Philippines' non-metallic minerals and aggregates are almost entirely government (MGB) estimates or operator self-reports, not disclosures made under international reporting standards such as JORC or NI 43-101. Unlike listed metal-mining companies' figures, they are not third-party verified. When you see an industry claim of "world's No. X," always check what indicator it ranks by — production, reserves, or import volume. Where the claim cannot be substantiated, it is safest to label it "unconfirmed."

2. The overall picture of non-metallic minerals

2.1 Number of operating mines

Per the MGB's "Minerals Industry at a Glance" (as of December 2024, updated April 2025), the breakdown of 59 operating non-metallic mines:

By comparison, the number of operating metal mines in the same period was 58 (nickel 36, gold 11, chromite 4, iron 4, copper 3). In terms of count, non-metallic mines outnumber metallic ones. Note that another compilation for 2024 gives "60 metallic, 61 non-metallic, employment of roughly 291,672," meaning the figures shift depending on the tally date.

注 This "59" is the count of mid-to-large permitted mines that the MGB tracks, and does not include the small-scale sand-and-gravel permits issued by provincial governors. Region I (Ilocos) alone has 339 gravel permit holders, and Region II's (Cagayan Valley) CY2020 tally shows 873 (per the MGB regional offices' "Summary of Operating Mines & Quarries"). The bulk of the real activity lies outside the official statistics.

2.2 Scale of production value

• 2024: total mining production value of roughly ₱316.29 billion, mineral exports of roughly US$7.38 billion (MGB)
• Jan–Sep 2025: metallic mineral production value of ₱219.74 billion (up from ₱191.42 billion the same period the prior year, +14.8%; MGB preliminary figures)
• The full-year CY2025 national figure for non-metallic minerals is not yet published as of August 2026 (only regional offices have published preliminary figures). 注 Unconfirmed

An example of regional actual figures (MGB Region I, CY2024): non-metallic total of ₱1.785 billion. Of this, gravel accounted for 2,378,527.53 m³ / ₱475.7 million; limestone, 1,620,254.87 tons / ₱412.81 million; shale, 793,244.81 tons / ₱126.17 million; silica, ₱9.456 million; and zeolite, ₱4.439 million. It is worth remembering that "gravel" makes up 27% of one region's non-metallic sales.

3. Limestone and the cement industry

3.1 Industry structure (as of August 2026)

The current membership of the industry association CeMAP (Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines) is Concreat, Holcim Philippines, Republic Cement, Taiheiyo Cement Philippines, and Goodfound Cement (per the association's site). 注 Note that San Miguel's Eagle Cement is not on this membership list. "The industry association's voice" does not equal "the voice of the whole industry."

3.2 The biggest news of 2026: Holcim's exit and the entry of Chinese capital

On August 2, 2026, Holcim (headquartered in Zug) announced an agreement to sell its Philippine business.

In 2019, San Miguel attempted, but failed, to acquire Holcim's Philippine operations for US$2.15 billion. This time the figure is roughly US$800 million. 注 A simple comparison is not valid (the scope, timing, and exchange rate differ), but the shrinking valuation can be read as reflecting the industry's profitability environment. With tensions rising in the West Philippine Sea, the political impact of Chinese capital entering a foundational construction-materials industry is an important thing to watch going forward.

3.3 Cement imports and anti-dumping measures — history and 2026

The Philippines has abundant limestone resources and excess domestic capacity, yet is, paradoxically, a major cement importer. Per CeMAP, domestic capacity roughly doubled from 27 million tons in 2014 to 50 million tons in 2024 (another source puts it at roughly 53 million tons), while demand remains in the mid-30-million-ton range. Utilization stays at 50–60%. Even so, imports were roughly 7 million tons in 2023, roughly 6.02 million tons in 2025, and 1.29 million tons in Q1 2026 (DTI/Global Cement).

(1) Anti-dumping duty (Vietnam-specific, company-by-company)

• Filed by Republic Cement, the Cemex-affiliated group (Solid Cement/Apo Cement), and Holcim Philippines
• Finalized in 2023, applicable for 5 years
• In July 2026, the DTI, via Administrative Order No. 26-05, rejected NCL Trading's protest and upheld the Tariff Commission's determination to maintain the duty for the full 5-year term
• Company-specific rates: NCL Trading 2% (US$0.82/ton); Vissai Ninh Binh 10% (US$4.03/ton); other Vietnamese exporters up to 23%
• Rationale: imports have declined, but "dumping continues at meaningful levels, and lifting the duty would risk the return of withdrawn exporters"

(2) Safeguard measure (country-agnostic)

Import share trends (DTI)

注 This is where things are commonly misunderstood: the anti-dumping duty and the safeguard measure are separate regimes that can apply simultaneously. Vietnamese product can be hit by both. Also, because the safeguard measure's "countries with under-3% share are excluded" rule is a dynamic mechanism, the exclusion list changes every year. Anyone planning procurement needs to check both the DTI's latest DAO and the BOC's latest circular.

Note that trade media reports the claim that "the Philippines was the world's 5th-largest importer of Portland cement in 2024," but this is a ranking by import volume, not by production or reserves. Do not conflate the two.

3.4 Competition law: the cement cartel investigation reaches a conclusion in 2026

• Launched in 2017 by the Philippine Competition Commission (PCC), triggered by a complaint from former DTI Undersecretary Victorio Dimagiba
• Targets: CeMAP, along with Cemex Holdings Philippines, Holcim Philippines, Republic Cement, and Taiheiyo Cement Philippines (suspected violations of Sections 14 and 15 of the Philippine Competition Act)
• Reported on June 3, 2026: the companies settled via a Consent Order under Section 37(c) of the same act. The fine of ₱40 million (roughly US$710,000) is the largest in PCC history. Conditions include strengthened compliance systems, revised internal policies, and competition-law training, with the possibility of reopening the case if violations recur (per MLex reporting and the PCC's decision document)

3.5 Prices

• From March 15, 2026, Concreat (DMCI-affiliated) began a phased price increase. A total of ₱20–30 per bag (roughly 10%), in ₱10 increments per phase. In the words of Mr. Consunji, "when fuel rises by ₱2, cement rises by ₱1"
• PSA Construction Materials Wholesale Price Index (CMWPI), March 2026: cement down 1.5% year-on-year (down 2.3% in February); gravel up 1.6% (flat in February); concrete products up 2.2%; fuel and lubricants up 7.9%
• 注 The index and actual market prices diverge. Even as the index shows cement falling, retail prices run ₱240–280 per 40kg bag (per Metro Manila retail listings, 2026). Base estimates on actual supplier quotes, not the index

4. Aggregates (gravel/crushed stone) and sand extraction — the structure of local politics

4.1 注 Permitting authority lies with the "provincial governor"

This is the single most important point for understanding the Philippine aggregates business. Whereas metal mining falls under DENR/MGB's central jurisdiction, gravel and crushed stone are controlled by local government units — provinces in particular.

Generally, the line drawn in practice is that commercial gravel extraction of 5 hectares or less falls to the provincial governor, and industrial-scale operations beyond that fall to the MGB. Barangays issue a "barangay clearance," but a barangay clearance alone does not constitute the right to extract — a common misunderstanding. Other players involved include DENR-EMB (Environmental Compliance Certificate, ECC), the municipal mayor (business permits, zoning), the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB), and, where indigenous peoples are involved, the NCIP's Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC).

4.2 Distribution of the tax — the source of political incentive

Section 138 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) (注 Confirmed amended, 2026-08-26: Section 38 of RA 12001 (RPVARA, approved June 13, 2024) amends RA 7160's Section 138 "insofar as they are inconsistent." That same section amends RA 7160's Sections 19, 135(a), 138, 201, 218, 220, and 472(b)(8), and repeals Sections 199(e)(g)(o), 212, and 219. What follows is therefore based on the original text of RA 7160 as enacted, as posted on LawPhil, and it is possible that the portion in conflict with RPVARA's Schedule of Market Values (SMV) is no longer current law. In practice, confirm against the ordinance of the province in question and BLGF circulars. Source: the text of Section 38, LawPhil ra_12001_2024.html):

• Provinces may levy a tax of up to 10% of the local market value per m³ on stone, sand, gravel, earth, and similar materials extracted from public lands, or from the bed of public waters such as seas, lakes, rivers, and streams
• Issuing the permit is the exclusive prerogative of the provincial governor (based on a provincial ordinance)
• Revenue distribution: 30% to the province, 30% to the municipality, and 40% to the barangay of extraction

注 An important limitation: per the Supreme Court ruling in Province of Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, provinces cannot tax gravel and similar materials extracted from private land (since it is already subject to excise tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, which falls under the restriction in Section 133). There are cases of double payment by people unaware of this precedent, told to "pay the province" regardless.

This structure — 40% flowing to the barangay — is the direct reason local politicians flock to gravel interests. Conversely, though, Pangasinan Governor Ramon Guico III has said quarrying brings the province only around ₱12 million a year (per Inquirer), suggesting that formal tax revenue is small, and the real prize lies in the informal income outside it.

4.3 Illegal quarrying and its ties to politics — concrete cases from 2025–2026

The Miagao case is, as of 2026, the clearest case study connecting the three points illegal extraction → flood-control project → corruption into a single line.

4.4 River gravel extraction and flood risk — the link to the flood-control corruption scandal

The chain of causation (注 understanding this is essential to reading the news):

1. Excessive riverbed extraction → riverbed lowering, bank instability, bridge-pier scouring → increased flood/embankment-collapse risk
2. → this creates demand for "flood-control projects are needed"
3. → flood-control budgets flow to the localities
4. → aggregates for that construction are again drawn from the same river (sometimes without a permit)
5. → back to step 1

As a past example: on the Sacobia River in Pampanga, the MGB confirmed that, against a recommended dredging volume of 4.7 million m³ in 1999, more than 12 million m³ was actually extracted (per Governor Pineda, 2017). Roughly 3 times the recommended volume.

The scale of the flood-control corruption scandal (2025–2026):

• Flood-control and disaster-prevention budgets from 2016–2025 are alleged to have been diverted by DPWH engineers, unlicensed contractors, legislators who are themselves contractors, relatives of a former public works secretary, and members of the Commission on Audit (COA)
• Finance Secretary Ralph Recto told the Senate that the economic loss from "ghost flood-control projects" in 2023–2025 amounted to ₱42.3–118.5 billion (equivalent to 95,000–266,000 jobs)
• As of 2022, 67 legislators were themselves public-works contractors on government projects
• In September 2025, the Independent Commission for Infrastructure (ICI) was established, recommending prosecution of 2 senators, 2 representatives, 1 DPWH engineer, and 1 COA commissioner
• November 2025: the Ombudsman filed charges in an Oriental Mindoro case, and the Sandiganbayan issued arrest warrants for 16 people. Pre-trial proceedings were held in January–February 2026
• September 21, 2025: a large protest called "Baha sa Luneta" ("Flood at Luneta")

The single biggest reason aggregate and cement demand has slumped in 2026 is, in the end, "the halt of public works following the corruption crackdown" (see Section 8).

5. Sea sand extraction (black sand) and Manila Bay

5.1 Manila Bay reclamation and dredging

• In August 2023, the Marcos administration fully suspended Manila Bay reclamation projects. Per the DENR, this covered 22 projects in Metro Manila and Cavite, though only 3 of those in Metro Manila were "under construction" at the time of the suspension
• Subsequently, Pasay (including SM's 390-hectare project) and Bacoor resumed as "compliant." 注 This is a half-finished state in which the moratorium nominally continues while the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) keeps processing individual projects case by case
• On December 23, 2025, church, environmental, and fisherfolk groups submitted a petition to the Office of the President seeking to halt 10 reclamation projects between Rizal Park and the CCP. This was made public on January 14, 2026, at a forum in Intramuros

Where the "fill material" for reclamation comes from is the crux of this issue. The PRA has told the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) that dredging contractors sell sand to Manila Bay reclamation developers. In other words, "river dredging (in the name of flood control)" and "Manila Bay reclamation" are linked through the same sand supply chain.

DENR Administrative Order 2020-07: the cost of dredging in designated zones is borne entirely by private contractors (no government funds are used); only companies with sufficient technical and financial capacity may apply for DPWH clearance. This design — in which the contractor recoups costs by selling the dredged sand rather than being paid directly — is itself the incentive for over-dredging.

5.2 Manila Bay's "white sand beach" — actually a dolomite beach

Developments in 2025–2026:

• In May 2025, fisherfolk and environmental groups petitioned the Supreme Court to stop the dumping of dolomite
• In July 2025, MMDA General Manager Artes pointed out that the project had blocked three major drainage outfalls — Faura, Remedios, and the Estero de San Antonio Abad — diverting rainwater to an overcapacity sewage treatment plant, naming it as one cause of flooding around Taft Avenue
• In November 2025, the House Committee on Good Government (chaired by Terry Ridon) launched an investigation. The first hearing was held the week of November 17. The key questions were whether the project was necessary at all, given the Supreme Court's continuing mandamus and the Manila Bay Sustainable Development Master Plan, and the condition of the drainage outfalls. The DENR, DEPDev, DPWH, MMDA, and the City of Manila were summoned
• 注 The hearing's conclusions and whether the dolomite will be removed could not be confirmed as of August 2026 (unconfirmed).

5.3 Sea sand/black sand (magnetite sand) in Cagayan and Ilocos

Scale: MGB data shows 1.75 million tons of magnetite produced from 2012–2014, entirely from offshore concessions in Cagayan province, with the whole output exported to China, worth US$41.6 million (₱2.263 billion). As of June 2022, 12 offshore magnetite MPSAs had been approved (8 in Cagayan, 4 in Leyte), totaling roughly 50,502 hectares. Environmental groups say roughly 20 magnetite extraction sites operate along the northern Luzon coast, from Cagayan through Ilocos to Zambales.

The focus of 2025–2026: from "sand extraction" to "river dredging"

A June 16, 2026 investigative report by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) is the definitive account in this area:

• Along the west coast from Cagayan, Ilocos, Zambales, to Mindoro, what used to be sand extraction by Chinese-linked companies has been replaced by "river dredging" by Filipino companies — but some of these companies were founded by Chinese nationals who recently obtained Filipino citizenship
• The implementer of the Cagayan River Restoration Project (launched 2021), Riverfront Construction Inc. (RCI), is headed by Feng Li, of Chinese national origin, who was naturalized in 2022
• The Abra River Restoration Project in Ilocos Sur is run by Isla Verde Mining and Development Corporation. Its shareholder, BBG Greenworld Resources Inc., shares a founder with one of the more than 10 companies that obtained black sand/magnetite extraction permits in Cagayan. In 2013, some Chinese-linked companies had their permits revoked, but BBG's was not, and it continues to operate in Aburug
• PCIJ maps more than 12 large-scale dredging projects nationwide being carried out under the banner of "river restoration/flood control"
• Currimao, Ilocos Norte, repeatedly appears as the main port for sand exports from Region I, less than 100 km from the mouth of the Abra River

The political dimension:

• In November 2024, Senator Raffy Tulfo raised the alarm about "illegal shipments of black sand from Zambales to China," asking "how does the DENR verify that sand dug up in Ilocos, Cagayan, and Zambales is really going to Manila Bay" and stating "there is a list of ships going straight from Zambales to China"
• In May 2025, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) Deputy Director-General Ashley Acedillo testified before the Senate that "sand from Manila Bay and elsewhere may have ended up as fill material for China's artificial islands in the South China Sea." President Marcos ordered a full investigation
• In May 2025, Representatives Brosas, Castro, and Manuel called for an investigation into the Cagayan River Restoration Project, alleging that Aparri fisherfolk's daily income had fallen from ₱7,000–9,000 to ₱900

Regulations and pending bills:

注 As of August 2026, no law fully banning black sand extraction has been enacted (this is not merely "unconfirmed" — it has simply not passed). The substance of regulation so far is limited to the new-application freeze under DAO 171-2022 and local government suspension orders.

6. Marble (Romblon Island)

注 A caution about ranking: while one figure holds that "Romblon accounts for 80% of domestic supply," another source describes it as the second-largest province by production statistics, after Bulacan. This is because "marble" and "marbleized limestone" (used for cement raw material and construction) fall under different statistical categories, so any discussion of ranking requires first confirming the premise. That a Freedom of Information (FOI) request for 2019–2025 marble production volume and value was filed with the PSA in January 2026 is itself circumstantial evidence that public statistics on this subject are not well organized.

7. Clay, silica sand, phosphate rock, and salt

7.1 The MGB's classification (essential for reading the statistics)

注 Both dolomite and limestone appear under both "fertilizer minerals" and "industrial minerals." Watch for double-counting when summing statistics.

7.2 Silica sand

• Silica production rose roughly fourfold, from 247,876.8 tons in 2010 to 1,004,115.6 tons in 2019 (PSA-related figures)
• Market size: US$118.19 million in 2025, projected US$157.80 million in 2034 (CAGR 3.26%, 2026–2034; per IMARC Group)
• The Philippines is a net importer of silica sand (imports substantially exceed exports), driven by expanding glass-manufacturing capacity and its concentration in Luzon (same source)
• Structural shift: as regulation on river sand extraction tightens, construction usage is shifting from river sand to processed silica sand

7.3 Phosphate rock and guano

• Philphos (Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation, Isabel, Leyte): ASEAN's largest phosphate fertilizer maker, with a capacity of roughly 1.17 million tons/year. Occupies 116 hectares within the 425-hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE), with two sulfuric acid plants, a phosphoric acid plant, a granulation plant, and an ammonium sulfate plant
• 注 Philphos imports 100% of its raw phosphate rock, sulfur, and ammonia. It does not use domestically mined phosphate rock — an extremely easy point to get wrong
• Suffered major damage in Typhoon Yolanda in 2013, fully resuming operations around 2021. Imports totaled US$46.3 million and exports US$8.24 million for April 2025–March 2026
• Ownership: the Zamora Group (roughly 70% as of 2015), with the Republic of Nauru holding roughly 30%
• Domestic phosphate rock and guano production is, per USGS compilations, intermittent and nearly dormant. Phosphate rock production fell 40% year-on-year in 2019, resuming in 2022

7.4 Clay, bentonite, perlite, zeolite

Fluctuations reported in the USGS Minerals Yearbook (extremely volatile):

• 2019: zeolite +45%, bentonite +39%, other crushed stone +21%, lime +11%, perlite −32%
• 2022: perlite +437%, bentonite +273%, kaolin +75%, zeolite +57%, shale +47%, unclassified clay +31%

注 Because the base figures are small, percentage swings are large. A claim like "increased X-fold" is meaningless unless you check the absolute quantity.

7.5 Rock salt and sea salt

The Philippines is in the unusual position of importing 93–97% of its salt.

Salt sits at the boundary between "mineral" and "fisheries/agriculture," and its lead agency is not the DENR/MGB but the Department of Agriculture's BFAR. This difference in jurisdiction matters a great deal in practice.

8. The 2026 construction slump and demand for industrial minerals

8.1 The macro figures

注 The construction sector was the fastest-growing of 16 industries in Q1 2026, up 3.1% quarter-on-quarter. The Q1-to-Q2 reversal was sharp, so judging solely from a single quarter's data risks a misreading.

8.2 The trajectory of cement demand (statements from CeMAP Chairman Reinier Dizon, in chronological order)

The DPWH budget is at the core of it: the DPWH's 2026 budget is ₱529.6 billion, less than half of the previous year's ₱1.1 trillion, cut as part of anti-corruption and transparency measures. Mr. Dizon has said "DPWH has replaced personnel, and reviews have become stricter." Cement demand in Q4 2025 was down −3% year-on-year.

Summary of the chain of causation: the flood-control corruption crackdown → the DPWH budget cut in half, plus project halts, stricter review, and delayed contractor licensing → public construction −32.4% (Q2) → declining aggregate and cement demand → further decline in domestic cement industry utilization → mounting pressure toward imports, driving calls for stronger safeguards → this may have influenced Holcim's decision to exit (August 2026).

8.3 The aggregates market

• The Philippines Construction Aggregates Market is projected to grow at a CAGR of 8% for 2026–2032 (6Wresearch). 注 However, this is a private research firm's forecast, and it runs in the opposite direction of the H1 2026 actuals (government construction at −32.4%). Always distinguish forecast-report figures from actuals.
• Constraints: premium pricing on crushed stone and gravel is squeezing budgets for low-cost projects, and environmental regulation on gravel extraction is limiting supply

9. 注 Common mistakes to avoid (summary)

1. 注 Do not confuse "reserves" with "resources." Limestone's resources (58.66 billion tons) and reserves (2.31 billion tons; per PSA-related figures) differ by a factor of more than 25.
2. 注 The Philippines' non-metallic mineral figures are not compliant with JORC/NI 43-101. They are chiefly government estimates and operator self-reports.
3. 注 "World's 5th-largest cement importer" is a ranking by import volume, not by production or reserves.
4. 注 Anti-dumping duties and safeguard measures are separate, co-existing regimes. Vietnamese product can be subject to both.
5. 注 The safeguard's country-exclusion list is dynamic (countries under a 3% import share are excluded). China and Indonesia were removed from exclusion in May 2026. Always confirm the latest DAO and BOC circular.
6. 注 San Miguel's Eagle Cement is not a member of CeMAP. "The industry association's view" does not equal "the whole industry's view."
7. 注 Permitting authority over gravel rests with the provincial governor, not with the DENR/MGB centrally. A barangay clearance is not a right to extract.
8. 注 Provinces cannot tax gravel extracted from private land (per the Province of Bulacan ruling).
9. 注 Manila Bay's "white sand" is not sand but crushed dolomite from Cebu. Project cost figures diverge across reports — ₱28 million, ₱349 million, and ₱389 million — with no confirmed single figure.
10. 注 "River dredging" and "sand extraction" are institutionally separate, but in practice continuous. Dredged material is sold into Manila Bay reclamation (per the PRA's own explanation to PCIJ).
11. 注 Philphos imports 100% of its raw phosphate rock. It is not a company built on domestic phosphate resources.
12. 注 Salt's lead agency is the Department of Agriculture's BFAR (not the DENR/MGB). Under RA 11985, salt is exempt from all taxes.
13. 注 The 2026 demand decline is not a business-cycle event but an institutional one, driven by the halt of public works following the corruption crackdown. The timing of recovery depends on the political calendar.
14. 注 The Holcim-to-Huaxin sale is expected to close in H1 2027 and has not yet been completed. It remains contingent on regulatory approval.

10. Main sources

• Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), "Minerals Industry at a Glance" (April 2025 update); the regional offices' "Mineral Production/Sales by Province, by Commodity" and "Summary of Operating Mines & Quarries"
• Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), National Accounts (Q2 2026, published August 7, 2026), the Construction Materials Wholesale Price Index (CMWPI), and PEENRA mineral accounts
• Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), DAO 25-15, DAO 26-03, AO 26-05 / Bureau of Customs circular (February 18, 2026)
• Holcim Ltd media release (August 2, 2026, Zug)
• Philippine Competition Commission (PCC) / MLex (June 3, 2026)
• Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), investigative reports of June 16, 2026 and December 2, 2025
• Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code), Section 138; Republic Act 7942 (Mining Act); Republic Act 11985 (Salt Industry Development Act); DENR AO 171-2022; DENR AO 2020-07
• BFAR (H1 2026 salt production); DOST-MIMAROPA (Romblon Marble Roadmap, April 2025)
• CeMAP, Global Cement, Cemnet, Philstar, BusinessWorld, Inquirer, Manila Bulletin, Manila Times, BusinessMirror, Rappler, SunStar, World Bank, USGS Minerals Yearbook, IMARC Group, 6Wresearch
• Taiheiyo Cement press releases, NNA ASIA, Nikkei

注 Items marked "unconfirmed" in this article (the full-year 2025 national non-metallic production value; the conclusions of the November 2025 House hearing on dolomite; the current legal status of Cebu province's dolomite export ban; and Romblon marble production statistics) could not be verified against a primary source as of August 24, 2026.

日本語の詳細版: 分野「経済・産業・ビジネス」「フィリピンの非金属鉱物と骨材 ── 石灰石・セメント・砂利・海砂・大理石」（本サイト日本語版）。