Mining and Nickel
The Philippines is the world's second-largest producer of nickel ore, and the world's largest exporter of unprocessed nickel ore. Yet mining's contribution to GDP is under 1% (0.51% in 2024, per MGB). This gap between geological wealth and economic weight is the starting point for every issue in this field.
1. The big picture — Philippine mining in numbers
| Item | Figure | Year/source |
|---|---|---|
| Total mining production value | ₱316.29 billion | 2024 / Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) |
| Mineral export value | Approximately US$7.38 billion | 2024 / MGB |
| GDP contribution | 0.51% | 2024 / MGB |
| Operating mines | 60 metallic, 61 non-metallic | MGB |
| Employment | Approximately 291,672 | MGB |
| Share of national territory under mining tenements | 2.62% (approximately 787,000 ha) | MGB |
| High mineralization-potential area | Approximately 9 million ha | 2026 / Executive Order No. 122 |
In 2024, gold overtook nickel as the top production item (gold: ₱126.36 billion / gold output: 28,870 kg). This was driven by soaring gold prices, and the pattern has continued since.
| Period | Metallic mineral production value | Year-on-year | Breakdown notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan-Jun 2025 | ₱135.62 billion | +15.1% | Led by gold; nickel-related ₱39.87 billion, copper ₱13.71 billion |
| Jan-Sep 2025 | ₱219.74 billion | +14.8% | Gold ₱117.42 billion (+28.9%) / nickel direct-shipping ore ₱52.48 billion |
| Jan-Mar 2026 | ₱82.8 billion | +28% | Nickel direct-shipping ore production value up 52.4%; volume 4.58 million DMT (+59.7%) |
Nickel direct-shipping ore (DSO) has surged since the start of 2026. The reason, discussed below, is production quota cuts in Indonesia.
2. The ban on unprocessed nickel-ore exports — the story of how it was dropped
注 A common misconception is that "the export-ban provision was removed in 2026," but the removal actually happened in 2025. What is happening in 2026 are the subsequent market and policy developments (Executive Order No. 122). Getting the timeline right matters.
July 2021 House Bill 9775 (a phased ban on unprocessed ore
exports) is filed in the House of Representatives
→ does not pass
3 February 2025 The Senate passes Senate Bill No. 2826 on third
reading — the "Enhanced Fiscal Regime for Large-
Scale Metallic Mining" bill
Contains a provision banning unprocessed ore
exports 5 years after signing (i.e., 2030)
Senate President Escudero explicitly calls it
the "Indonesian approach"
11 June 2025 The bicameral conference committee removes the
ban provision in reconciling the bill
The Senate approves the conference report
(only Senator Hontiveros votes against)
4 September 2025 President Marcos signs it into law
→ Republic Act No. 12253 (RA 12253)
The export-ban provision did not make it in
Why it was dropped — the industry's reasoning
The Philippine Nickel Industry Association (PNIA) praised the removal as "a prudent and forward-looking decision that protects jobs and preserves investor confidence." The core of the association's argument runs as follows.
| Point | PNIA/industry argument |
|---|---|
| No domestic smelting capacity | A ban with nowhere for the ore to go. High electricity costs, weak infrastructure, policy uncertainty, and permitting delays must be resolved first, or no smelter will ever get built |
| Investment freeze | A ban set for 5 years out would halt exploration investment immediately (per PNIA Chairman Bravo) |
| Status as a supply nation | Would cost the Philippines its reputation as a "stable supplier" in the global market |
| Support for the tax regime itself | The framework of profit-linked royalties and a windfall-profits tax was supported as consistent with international norms |
The Chamber of Mines of the Philippines (COMP) held its industry-wide event, "Mining Philippines 2025" (themed "From Policy to Progress"), in November 2025 for the first time in two years. Chairman Toledo said "the Philippines needs another pillar of growth" and that "mining once accounted for over 20% of export revenue," arguing that if stalled large-scale projects (Tampakan, King-king, Silangan) move forward, mining's export contribution could reach 9% and its GDP contribution 1.5%. COMP has adopted the Mining Association of Canada's "Towards Sustainable Mining" standard.
3. The substance of RA 12253 (the Enhanced Fiscal Regime)
Signed 4 September 2025. Originated as Senate Bill No. 2826.
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Royalty (outside mineral reservations) | A 5-tier, profit-margin-linked rate of 1-5%. Operations with low profit margins pay a minimum royalty of 0.1% of gross output value |
| Royalty (within mineral reservations) | Remains 5% as before |
| Windfall profits tax | A 5-tier rate of 1-10% on the portion of profit margin exceeding 30% |
| Project-level ring-fencing | Bans offsetting profits and losses across multiple mines — a loss-making mine can no longer be used to erase a profitable mine's tax liability (newly introduced) |
| Thin-capitalization rule | Debt-to-equity ratio of 2:1 |
| Local business tax | 0.5% |
| Allocation | 40% of collected excise tax, royalties, etc. go to local government units; 10% of royalties from government mineral reservations go to the MGB, MIRDC, and others |
| Transparency | Monitoring and auditing of mineral sales and exports, public data disclosure, and establishment of a multi-stakeholder accountability body |
| Projected fiscal impact | ₱25.08 billion total for 2026-2029 (an average of ₱6.26 billion per year) |
This law also closes out roughly a decade of legislative stalemate, dating back to when Executive Order No. 79 (2012) froze new mining contracts.
4. Comparison with Indonesia — can the Philippines follow "the same path"?
| Indonesia | Philippines | |
|---|---|---|
| Unprocessed ore exports | Fully banned since 2020 (nickel) | Not banned (the provision was removed from RA 12253) |
| Smelters | Large-scale buildout, mainly with Chinese capital | Only 2 HPAL plants (both Sumitomo Metal Mining-affiliated) |
| Electricity | Built cheap, self-owned coal power (reference: approximately ₱5.31/kWh) | Highest electricity price in Southeast Asia, at ₱12.43/kWh (June 2026, DOE; ₱0.09 above Singapore) (see the field article "Electricity and Power Rates") (corrected in the 2026-08-25 cross-check pass; the earlier phrasing "among the highest in Asia" had an unclear metric and scope. Source: field article "General Review of Underground Resources" §9-1) |
| Production-quota system | RKAB (annual production plan approval) | None |
| 2026 policy | Cut the RKAB quota to 260-270 million wmt (down about 30% from the 379 million wmt approved in 2025). Also shortened the approval period from 3 years to 1 year | Executive Order No. 122 pushes "downstreaming," but through incentives rather than restriction |
The ironic result: because Indonesia cut back its own mining, Indonesian smelters have started buying up Philippine ore. Having chosen not to ban exports, the Philippines has instead become a raw-material supplier to Indonesia.
| Export destination | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total | — | 44.97 million wet metric tons (wmt) (+10.1%) | 55.08 million tons |
| China | — | 35.12 million wmt (-12% year-on-year) | 39.50 million tons / US$989.07 million |
| Indonesia | 215,000 wmt | 9.55 million wmt | 15.45 million tons / US$477.58 million |
| Japan | — | — | 130,000 tons / US$4.86 million |
Nickel ore export value in 2025 reached US$1.47 billion (+40.8%), the highest in over a decade (Philippine Statistics Authority). In H1 2026, shipments to Indonesia are reported to have risen roughly 65% year-on-year.
注 The understanding that "Philippine nickel goes to China" was true only through 2023. China's relative share has since fallen, while shipments to Indonesia have expanded sharply.
Nickel prices (LME), 2025-2026
2025 Opened at $15,295/t. The Senate's export-ban bill
and US tariffs caused sharp swings in the first
half; the second half traded in the $15,000-15,500/t
range
Late Dec 2025 Indonesian Energy and Mineral Resources Minister
Bahlil signals a production cut
→ surges to $16,560/t
29 Jan 2026 $18,950/t (an 18-month high)
11 Feb 2026 Above $17,000/t
May 2026 Multi-year high territory (around $19,000)
June 2026 Down about 14% month-on-month; combined LME +
Shanghai inventory peaks at 468,600 tons
Jul-Aug 2026 Adjusting in the low $16,000s, weighed down by
speculation of an upward quota revision
The International Nickel Study Group (INSG) has revised its 2026 supply-demand outlook from a "283,000-ton surplus" to a "32,000-ton deficit." Given the weight of inventories, however, some institutions still see a continuing surplus, and views remain divided.
5. Nickel intermediate products — the two HPAL plants
The only real "downstream" activity in the Philippines consists of two HPAL (High Pressure Acid Leach) plants operated by Sumitomo Metal Mining. These produce mixed nickel-cobalt sulfide (MS, with Ni content of 55-57%) from low-grade limonite ore (roughly 0.8-1.5% Ni), which is then finished into electrolytic nickel and nickel sulfate at Sumitomo's Japanese smelters (Niihama, Harima).
| Coral Bay Nickel (CBNC) | Taganito HPAL (THPAL) | |
|---|---|---|
| Location | Bataraza, Palawan (inside the Rio Tuba mine) | Claver, Surigao del Norte, Taganito Special Economic Zone |
| Operating since | April 2005 (Line 1) | October 2013 operations began → June 2014 trial run completed, full rated capacity reached in August (reconciled in the 2026-08-25 cross-check pass; field article "Gold and Investment/Japanese Companies" §6-3 states "operations began October 2013," and field article "Copper and Other Metal Resources" §6-4 states "trial run completed June 2014, rated capacity reached in August" — the two are treated as referring to the distinct milestones of start-up versus reaching rated capacity) |
| Capacity | Line 2: approximately 22,000-24,000 t/yr Ni, 1,400-2,500 t/yr Co | 30,000 t/yr Ni (approximately 2,600 t/yr Co), with a target of raising this to 36,000 t/yr |
| Ownership | Led by Sumitomo Metal Mining. Nickel Asia sold its remaining 15.625% stake to Sumitomo in 2024-25, making CBNC a wholly owned Sumitomo subsidiary (January 2025) | Sumitomo Metal Mining 62.5% / Nickel Asia 22.5% / Mitsui & Co. 15.0% (注field article "Gold and Investment/Japanese Companies" §6-3 lists "Sumitomo 75% / NAC 10% / Mitsui 15%" — the stakes differ by source. Both figures are presented together following the 2026-08-25 cross-check; direct confirmation against Sumitomo Metal Mining's IR materials or Nickel Asia's annual report is needed = unconfirmed) |
| Total investment | — | 注Reported as either approximately US$1.3 billion or approximately US$1.6 billion, depending on the source (both figures presented together following the 2026-08-25 cross-check; field article "Copper and Other Metal Resources" §6-4 gives US$1.6 billion) |
On 2 June 2026, Nickel Asia Corporation (NIKL) disclosed that it had received notice from CBNC that the Palawan HPAL plant would be shut down once the Tailings Storage Facility (TSF No. 3) reaches capacity. This is expected around 2028. The background is that building a new tailings storage facility does not pencil out at current nickel prices. The Board of Investments (BOI) has been sounding out overseas investors about taking over this facility and other existing assets at an investment forum with Canada in March 2026.
注 This is a story about the possible disappearance of a facility that symbolized "Philippine downstreaming." Coming right after Executive Order No. 122 championed "downstreaming," the gap between policy and reality stands out sharply.
Nickel Asia Corporation
The country's largest nickel ore producer — a conglomerate with 7 operating mines, a stake in THPAL, and a renewable-energy subsidiary (Emerging Power Inc.). In April 2026 it signed an agreement to acquire a 20% stake in a copper operation in eastern Kazakhstan (East Copper Production LLP), part of an effort to diversify away from being solely dependent on nickel. Listed on the PSE (ticker: NIKL).
New HPAL proposals
The Board of Investments (BOI) has stated it expects 3 additional plants (in Zambales, Surigao, and Palawan) under the Marcos administration, together worth roughly US$12 billion. Nickel Asia is reportedly considering a roughly 30,000-ton-per-year plant (over US$1 billion) on the Pujada Peninsula in Davao Oriental, and Global Ferronickel Holdings is reportedly weighing a roughly 40,000-ton-per-year plant in Surigao with a Chinese partner. As of August 2026, neither has reached a final investment decision (some details remain unconfirmed).
6. Gold and copper — the fate of the three big projects
| Project | Location | Operator | Status (as of August 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Silangan | Surigao del Norte | Philex Mining (MVP Group) | The first large-scale project to reach commercial production under the Marcos administration. Originally targeted for Q1 2025 → then March 2026 → now Q3 2026, delayed by the pace of processing-plant equipment installation. Initial daily throughput of 2,000 tons, scaling up in stages to 12,000 tons/day (4 million tons/year). Phase 1 (Boyongan) mineable reserves of 81 million tons. Mine life is 28 years across the whole tenement (per Philex/PMRC) (corrected in the 2026-08-25 cross-check pass; the earlier figure of "22 years" appears to have been an estimate for Phase 1 alone but could not be substantiated. Source: field article "Gold Reserves and Deposits," Chapter 7, "28-year mine life") |
| Tampakan | South Cotabato | Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (SMI) | The country's largest copper-gold deposit. Originally slated to start in 2026, but delayed to 2028. Projected annual output of approximately 375,000 tons of copper and 360,000 ounces of gold, with a mine life of 17 years (注some reporting cites "over 40 years," an inconsistency). 注Development cost is reported anywhere from US$5.9 billion to US$1.1 billion depending on the outlet — unresolved (likely reflects full development versus an initial phase). The often-cited "US$200 billion" refers to the crude in-ground value of the metal, not an investment figure. A strategic partner is being sought. Glencore withdrew from the project in 2015 (corrected in the 2026-08-25 cross-check pass; the earlier draft stated a flat "development cost of approximately US$1.1 billion." Source: field articles "Major Gold Mines and Production" §4-2 and "Gold Reserves and Deposits," Chapter 7) |
| King-king | Davao de Oro | St. Augustine Gold & Copper | Not yet under construction. Described as one of the world's largest undeveloped copper-gold deposits |
| Didipio | Border of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino | OceanaGold, 80% | Operating. A March 2026 technical report update extended the mine life to 2037. Underground mining capacity is being raised from 1.7 million to 2.5 million tons per year. Flooding of lower levels from a 2024 typhoon caused 2025 gold production to fall 6% year-on-year. As of 2026, ₱768.43 million has been budgeted for closure and rehabilitation planning, of which ₱551.40 million has already been placed in a trust fund |
Gold is tied to the central bank's (BSP) gold-purchase program. Republic Act No. 11256 (2019) exempts small-scale miners and gold traders from income tax and excise tax on gold sold to the BSP. OceanaGold Philippines sold approximately 6,684 ounces of gold doré to the BSP in 2025, exceeding its minimum 25% commitment. 注The often-cited figure of "approximately 31% of annual production" is a ratio against gold-doré production specifically — against Didipio's total 2025 gold output of 90,700 ounces, it is actually only 7.4% (the remainder is exported as gold contained within copper concentrate). This should not be confused with total gold production (noted during the 2026-08-25 cross-check). An estimated 200,000-300,000 people work in small-scale gold mining, and outflow to the black market continues (per PIDS research).
7. The Mining Act (RA 7942) and the history of regulation
1987 Constitution All natural resources are state-owned
(the Regalian Doctrine)
1995 Republic Act No. 7942, the "Philippine
Mining Act of 1995"
Implementing rules: DENR Administrative
Order 2010-21
24 March 1996 The Marcopper mining disaster (Marinduque
Island)
A drainage tunnel plug at the Tapian open
pit fails,
spilling over 1.6 million m³ of mine
tailings into the Boac River. Roughly 27 km
contaminated
20 villages evacuated; 59 children treated
for lead poisoning
注Death tolls of "3 people" (immediately
after the accident) and "at least 36 people
(from heavy-metal contamination)" both
appear (field article "General Review of
Underground Resources" §5-1) — the
difference likely reflects differing scope
(presented together following the
2026-08-25 cross-check)
A US$100 million (approximately ₱5.8
billion) settlement was reached on 3 October
2025, with US$50 million placed in escrow in
March 2026
Co-owned by Canadian firm Placer Dome;
litigation continues 30 years on
2012 Executive Order No. 79 — freezes new mining
contracts (pending tax reform)
July 2016 Environment Secretary Gina Lopez orders an
audit of 41 large-scale mines
28 of them nickel mines → international
nickel prices spike
2 February 2017 Closure orders for 23 mines, suspension
orders for 5 mines,
an open-pit mining ban, and cancellation
of 75 MPSAs
Only 13 of the 41 companies were allowed
to keep operating
May 2017 The Commission on Appointments rejects
her confirmation → she is removed from
office
The closure orders were subsequently
barely enforced; 5 years later, 15 of the
28 cases remained under dispute (per PCIJ)
14 April 2021 Executive Order No. 130 — lifts the 9-year
freeze on new mining contracts (under
Duterte)
注EO 130 lifted the moratorium, not the
open-pit ban
23 December 2021 DENR repeals the open-pit ban (DAO
2017-10) — via DAO 2021-40
(Signed by Secretary Roy Cimatu;
covers copper, gold, silver, and complex
ores. Published 25 December, takes effect
15 days later)
(corrected in the 2026-08-25 cross-check
pass; the earlier draft's "28 December"
conflated the publication date. Source:
field articles "Gold — Institutions, Tax,
and BSP" Chapter 3 and "Gold and
Investment/Japanese Companies" §9-3, both
of which give 23 December 2021 as the
signing date of DAO 2021-40)
4 September 2025 Republic Act No. 12253 (fiscal regime)
21 August 2026 Executive Order No. 122 (critical minerals)
Tenement types and foreign-ownership rules
| Type | Foreign ownership | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| MPSA (Mineral Production Sharing Agreement) and similar mineral agreements | Requires at least 60% Filipino capital | The most common type |
| FTAA (Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement) | Up to 100% foreign ownership allowed | A constitutional exception. Requires an investment of at least US$50 million, must be personally signed by the President, and runs for a 25-year term (renewable) |
The structure whereby "100% foreign ownership is possible only through an FTAA, which additionally requires the President's own signature" has repeatedly been cited as the biggest institutional bottleneck holding back exploration investment.
8. Executive Order No. 122 (EO 122, signed 21 August 2026)
The "Unified National Policy Framework for Developing the Critical Minerals Industry."
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Coverage | Lithium, copper, nickel, cobalt, graphite, rare earths, and others. Nickel, copper, and cobalt are of particular importance to the Philippines |
| 4 guiding principles | ① State ownership ② Economic development through critical minerals ③ Environmental protection and social/cultural development ④ Policy stability and mechanisms for private-sector participation |
| Downstreaming | Moving beyond dependence on raw-ore exports to build a domestic value chain from refining through battery manufacturing. The Board of Investments (BOI) grants incentives under the CREATE Act |
| Governance structure | Reorganizes the Mining Industry Coordinating Council (MICC), to be co-chaired by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Finance (DOF), with local and indigenous-peoples' representatives also participating |
| "Use it or lose it" | Dormant or non-performing critical-minerals tenements will be cancelled and returned to mineral reservations |
| Deadlines | Streamlining of permits: within 6 months / A fully digital one-stop shop: within 1 year / MICC's comprehensive work plan: within 90 days |
| Area covered | Approximately 9 million ha of high-potential territory |
MGB Director Elades described it as "shifting national strategy beyond raw-ore exports, toward building an integrated ecosystem of processing and manufacturing." The Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) positioned the region as "a strategic gateway to the critical-minerals and clean-energy economy."
注 Pushback followed immediately. ACT Teachers party-list Representative Antonio Tinio called it "a wholesale handover of mineral resources to foreigners" that would trigger large-scale displacement of farmers and indigenous peoples.
9. Environmental and indigenous-rights conflicts
FPIC (Free, Prior and Informed Consent)
Section 59 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA, 1997, RA 8371) provides that no concession or license may be issued or renewed without a certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and that this certification is issued only where FPIC has been obtained. Section 16 of the Mining Act similarly requires prior consent for mining on ancestral lands.
The Lepanto case (Lepanto Consolidated Mining): the government required FPIC compliance for a 1990 MPSA renewal, but the company argued that "the agreement predates IPRA and constitutes a vested right" and that "the dispute should be handled through arbitration." The Supreme Court vacated the arbitral ruling in the company's favor and held that MPSA renewal also requires FPIC and NCIP certification. 注 The key point is that the notion of "an arbitration clause can be used to bypass indigenous rights" was rejected.
Conflicts on the ground (2025-2026)
| Area | Details |
|---|---|
| Palawan | Pala'wan leaders have alleged that NCIP staff manipulated FPIC proceedings, claiming approval was secured through a dubious "majority vote" rather than genuine consensus |
| Sibuyan Island (Romblon) | Corruption allegations surrounding an FPIC process. NCIP issued a stop order to the company involved. The island is home to numerous endemic species (roughly 700 vascular plant species, 54 of them endemic) |
| Benguet (Itogon, Mankayan) | On 21 July 2025, residents of Sitio Dalicno filed a civil suit against ISRI, MGB, NCIP, and others. On 27 June 2025, Australia's Blackstone Minerals acquired an interest through a merger with IDM |
| Nationwide | A third of land and environmental defenders killed from 2012-2023 were indigenous people, and roughly half of those killings were mining-related (per Global Witness) |
| Sumitomo Metal Mining | Since March 2025, NGOs from the Philippines and Japan (ELAC, LRC, PARC, FoE Japan) have run an ongoing international petition demanding a halt to operations at Rio Tuba/Coral Bay. On 5 June 2026, signatures from 11,315 people across 64 countries were delivered to the company's Tokyo headquarters. The basis cited is a report finding hexavalent chromium above environmental standards in the Togpon River |
Palawan's 50-year moratorium
On 13 March 2025, the province of Palawan signed Provincial Ordinance No. 3646, suspending barangay/municipal/provincial endorsements for both small- and large-scale mining applications for 50 years (renewable). Approved unanimously by all 14 provincial board members. This caused 67 applications to lapse, halting plans covering over 200,000 ha. Operations already underway in the six existing districts (Bataraza, Brooke's Point, Española, Narra, Quezon, Aborlan) continue. PNIA opposed the ordinance as "exceeding local government authority and conflicting with the Constitution and the Mining Act."
注 The Supreme Court struck down Occidental Mindoro's 25-year mining moratorium as inconsistent with the Mining Act (RA 7942), in Province of Occidental Mindoro v. Agusan Petroleum, G.R. No. 248932 (decided 14 January 2025 / published 14 May 2025). (Corrected in the 2026-08-25 cross-check pass; the earlier draft treated "14 May 2025" as the decision date. Source: field article "Gold and Investment/Japanese Companies" §9-1 and "General Review of Underground Resources" §4-2.) Industry groups have cited this precedent in seeking to invalidate the Palawan ordinance. "A province can unilaterally halt mining" does not hold under current law — that is the operative understanding.
10. Practical takeaways
- Investment gateways: MGB (tenements/technical matters), BOI (incentives), NCIP (FPIC), DENR-EMB (Environmental Compliance Certificate, ECC), and local government units (endorsement resolutions). LGU endorsement is the de facto chokepoint, as the Palawan example shows.
- Taxation: Under RA 12253, a profit-linked royalty plus a windfall-profits tax plus project-level ring-fencing. This raises the effective tax burden for companies with multiple mines.
- Electricity: Smelting and HPAL operations require large amounts of power and sulfuric acid. Southeast Asia's highest electricity price (₱12.43/kWh, June 2026, DOE) is a core factor holding back Philippine downstreaming (see the field article "Electricity and Power Rates"). (Corrected from "among the highest in Asia," with the metric and source made explicit, in the 2026-08-25 cross-check pass)
- 注 Do not build business plans on the assumption that "the Philippines will eventually halt exports like Indonesia." The ban provision was dropped in 2025, and Executive Order No. 122 in 2026 is also framed around incentives and "use it or lose it," not prohibition.
- 注 Conversely, the risk of future re-legislation is not zero. The Senate has passed such a provision once already, and the possibility of it being refiled in the current Congress remains open (as of August 2026, no specific bill with a realistic chance of passage has been confirmed).
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