Rare Earths and Strategic Minerals in the Philippines — Expectations vs. Reality, and the Framework After EO 122

As of 2026-08-30 · Updated 2026-08-30 · Section: Mineral Resources · 日本語版

The Philippines is a "nickel powerhouse," but it is not a "rare earth (REE) powerhouse." The two are frequently confused. Centered on Executive Order No. 122, s. 2026 (EO 122), signed on 21 August 2026, this article separates what has actually been confirmed about the country's resources from what has not.

1. Conclusion up front

2. 注 Before you read the numbers — "reserves," "resources," and "occurrence" are not the same thing

This is where misreadings happen most often in articles about subsurface resources, and Philippine press coverage is especially loose about the distinction.

Nearly all the figures circulating about Philippine rare earths belong to the third tier — occurrence/geochemical anomaly. If a Japanese-language article uses the word "reserves," the first suspicion should be mistranslation or misuse.

注 How to treat the claim "the Nth most mineral-rich country in the world"

• Claims such as "the Philippines is the fifth most mineralised country in the world" and "$1 trillion in undeveloped reserves" have become fixtures in legal practice guides (Chambers and Partners, Mining 2026) and investment-promotion materials.
• Tracing the claim back, however, government/industry presentation materials from 2010–2011 describe a density metric — "3rd in gold, 4th in copper, 5th in nickel, 6th in chromite by mineral occurrence per unit area" — a metric that favors archipelagic nations.
• The "per unit area" qualifier appears to have dropped out somewhere along the way, hardening into a claim of absolute global ranking. The dollar figure also varies by edition: $840 billion → $1 trillion → $1.4 trillion.
• The U.S. International Trade Administration (ITA) does not cite a specific rank, only calling the Philippines "one of the most mineral-rich countries in the world." It is unconfirmed that any peer-reviewed body such as USGS has published a comprehensive national ranking of "degree of mineralization."
• 注 Conclusion: if "5th in the world" is used in any material, it should always be annotated as "an industry/government claim based on density of occurrence per unit area."

3. The reality of rare earths — how much has actually been confirmed

3.1 The state of academic knowledge

The peer-reviewed paper "The rare earth element (REE) potential of the Philippines" (Journal of Geochemical Exploration, 2022, vol. 242, 107082) remains the most systematic assessment to date. Its abstract is unambiguous: "no known economic REE deposits exist in the Philippines," while identifying bauxite, ion-adsorption clays, and nickel laterite as potential future sources.

(Source: Journal of Geochemical Exploration 2022, 242:107082. Acknowledges DOST-PNRI, MGB Regional Offices III/V/VIII, PNOC Exploration, and the LGUs of Ilocos Norte, Camarines Norte, and Palawan.)

• The most strategically significant site is the ion-adsorption clay at El Nido. It contains heavy rare earths (HREE: Dy, Er, Y, Sm, etc.) reportedly comparable in cutoff grade to southern China's ion-adsorption deposits. Heavy rare earths are the tightest-supplied segment for magnet applications (Dy, Tb), so a viable deposit here would matter a great deal.
• 注 However, 300 ppm is a concentration — how much is present in the material — not a tonnage. How many tons exist has not been published.
• Prior research: Padrones, Imai & Takahashi (2017), Resource Geology 67:231–253, used sequential extraction to analyze the weathered zone of the Daroctan granite in northern Palawan and found that 53–74% of ΣREE was extractable via ion-exchangeable phases, pointing to the potential of an ion-adsorption resource.

3.2 Government-side surveys

注 The Philippine Rise lies at a depth of 2,000–5,000 m. It was approved by the UN CLCS in April 2012 as an extended continental shelf under the law of the sea, but survey work remains at an early stage, with no prospect yet of commercial extraction. The area around the Benham Bank was also designated a marine resource reserve in 2018.

3.3 Scandium associated with nickel laterite — the sole actual track record

The only rare-earth-group element the Philippines can genuinely claim to be producing is scandium (Sc).

Three points stand out. 1. In a market where global supply is only 15–20 t/year, a single Philippine site accounts for 7–8 t, which is an enormous share by percentage — though the absolute volume, and the dollar value, remain small. 2. It is often cited politically as a model case of downstream value-addition, but final refining takes place in Japan. EO 122's call for "domestic value-addition" is, in this case, only half realized. 3. Most of the scandium is lost, precipitating with iron and aluminum during HPAL's neutralization step. That means the existing nickel residue (tailings) is itself a scandium resource, and research is advancing on it as a target for "technosphere mining" (Minerals Engineering, 2022, among others).

注 THPAL has also commercialized recovery of chromite as a by-product since 2021. By-product recovery is at the center of the Philippines' realistic "critical minerals" strategy.

3.4 Heavy mineral sands containing monazite and zircon

• Heavy mineral sands (HMS) are concentrations, in beaches and river mouths, of dense minerals (magnetite 5.2, monazite 5.15, ilmenite 4.72, xenotime 4.75, zircon 4.65 g/cm³, etc.).
• Monazite ((Ce,La,Nd,Th)PO₄) is an REE mineral, but it typically contains around 7%, and up to 12%, thorium (Th) (World Nuclear Association).
• 注 This is the single biggest obstacle to commercialization. Many monazite projects have failed to reach viability because of radioactive-waste disposal costs. In a well-known precedent, roughly 160,000 t of monazite from Western Australia was exported to France between 1980 and 1995, but the processing plant was later closed because the radioactive waste could not be disposed of.
• Philippine beach sands (Erawan at ~600 ppm, etc.) carry the same constraint. The distance between "black sand contains rare earths" and "a rare earth industry can be built" is very large.

4. Executive Order No. 122 (EO 122, s. 2026)

4.1 Overview

4.2 Key provisions (as reported)

4.3 注 A caution about the list of covered mineral types

Press coverage (PTV News, Manila Bulletin, Philstar, GMA, and others) cites "lithium, copper, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths" as examples of critical minerals, but the existence and content of a definitive list of mineral types (an annex) attached to the text of EO 122 remains unconfirmed in the Official Gazette as of 2026-08-24. Any Japanese-language article that asserts "this is the Philippines' definitive critical minerals list" should have its source checked.

4.4 Assessment and criticism

Substantive assessment: EO 122 is "administrative groundwork to encourage exploration and attract processing investment"; it has neither discovered new rare earth deposits nor increased reserves. The 9-million-hectare figure refers to "prospective areas" — i.e., occurrence potential — not reserves.

5. The Philippines' critical minerals — by the numbers

Size of the industry as a whole (MGB) - 2024: Total mining production value (including non-metallic minerals): ₱316.29 billion; mineral exports approximately $7.38 billion. 注Metallic-minerals-only production value is cited as ₱252.9 billion (corrected in a 2026-08-25 cross-check: the earlier entry described ₱316.29 billion as "metallic minerals production value," but the five source documents within the cluster treat it as total mining production value. Source: field "Copper and Other Metal Resources" §2-2 / "Non-Metallic Minerals and Aggregates" §2.2 / "Mining and Nickel" ch. 1. MGB has not clearly stated the difference between the two definitions, and primary confirmation of the ₱252.9 billion figure remains incomplete = unconfirmed) - Jan–Sep 2025: production value ₱219.742 billion (+14.8% YoY) - Q1 2026: ₱82.78 billion (+28.6% YoY). Gold ₱53.78 billion, nickel DSO ₱10.69 billion - Operating mines: 60 metallic, 61 non-metallic. Employment: approximately 291,672. Mining-claim area: 787,279 ha (2.62% of national territory)

注 In June 2025, the bicameral conference committee deleted a provision that would have banned unprocessed nickel ore exports by 2030. It had been included in the Senate version (SB 2826, passed on third reading 3 February 2025), but was dropped due to strong industry opposition (electricity costs, infrastructure, and the fact that smelters cannot be built in five years). Consequently, the Philippines has no Indonesian-style ban on raw ore exports. EO 122's downstream push is incentive-driven, not a prohibition.

6. How the U.S., EU, Japan, and China view the Philippines

6.1 United States

注 The MOU is not a legally binding procurement contract. Its content is a "framework" for promoting investment in processing, refining, and downstream manufacturing, technology transfer, and workforce development. Critics (economist Cielo Magno) note that "with mining taxes and royalties at the regional floor, the country has no bargaining leverage," while the scientist group AGHAM points out that there is "no guarantee of technology transfer."

6.2 EU

• The Philippines is not an EU strategic partner under the Critical Raw Materials (CRM) strategy. No Philippine project appears among the 47 strategic projects announced in March 2025, nor among the 7 third-country projects announced on 4 June 2025 (Canada, Greenland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Serbia, Ukraine, and Zambia).
• The EU is discussing a joint scoping study with DENR on mineral-prospective areas. EU Ambassador Massimo Santoro described it as of October 2025 as "work in progress" and stated that "it is not a survey for the EU to mine." No formal agreement has been confirmed to exist as of 2026-08-24.
• Targets for 2030 under the CRM Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252): 10% domestic extraction, 40% domestic processing, 25% recycling, and no more than 65% dependence on a single third country for any strategic raw material.

6.3 Japan

For Japanese companies, the Philippines functions less as an "ore supplier" than as a "production base for HPAL intermediate products and scandium." Missing this distinction risks misreading where Japan's actual interest lies.

注 That said, Sumitomo Metal Mining's Palawan operations (Coral Bay/Rio Tuba) received a joint petition in April 2025 from 86 organizations across 39 countries calling for a halt to operations over hexavalent chromium exceeding water-quality standards (Friends of the Earth Japan and others). Japanese corporate involvement is not free of controversy.

6.4 China

7. The black-sand mining problem

7.1 注 Getting the terminology straight first

• What is called "black sand" (buhangin na itim) in the Philippines is beach sand dominated by magnetite, and it has been exported as iron ore for Chinese steelmaking. It is not a rare earth resource.
• Rare earths (e.g., monazite) can occur as trace accessories in the same heavy mineral sands, but Philippine black-sand mining has consistently been driven by demand for iron. When a Japanese-language article says "illegal rare-earth mining in the Philippines," it is usually this same confusion.

7.2 The reality

7.3 The shift after 2022 — repackaged as "dredging"

PCIJ's investigative report of 16 June 2026 is the most recent and most detailed to date.

• Coastal sand mining has largely been replaced by river dredging projects nominally undertaken for flood control. The operators are formally Philippine companies, but some were established by Chinese nationals who have recently acquired Philippine citizenship.
• Example: the representative of Riverfront Construction Inc., which carries out the Cagayan River rehabilitation project, is Feng Li — a Chinese-born individual naturalized by legislation in 2022.
• Example: GC8 Kinming is 51% owned by GC8 Dredging and Reclamation Corp. and 12.25% by CCCC Shanghai Dredging Co., a subsidiary of China's state-owned CCCC (per SEC records). The same owner is also behind the 407-hectare "New Manila Bay – City of Pearl" Manila Bay reclamation, a Belt and Road flagship project.
• Scale of the Cagayan River dredging project: roughly 31.87 km covering Aparri, Camalaniugan, and Lallo; 19 sandbars totaling approximately 275 ha; dredge volume of approximately 7 million m³. It was justified as flood-control work following the damage from Typhoon "Ulysses" (Vamco) in November 2020, which affected 580,000 people and killed 24 in the same area.
• In May 2025, Malacañang confirmed that President Marcos had ordered an investigation into allegations that dredged sand was flowing into China-linked reclamation in the West Philippine Sea (Presidential Press Officer Claire Castro).
• 注 Cagayan Governor Manuel Mamba has denied black-sand mining and has stated he would "resign if it can be proven." This remains a contested allegation, not an established fact.

7.4 Damage

• Coastal erosion is the core impact. In Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, the sand dunes that once served as a wave barrier have disappeared, allowing seawater to reach inland at high tide.
• In Cagayan, collapsed houses, shrinking rice paddies, salt intrusion, and sharply reduced fish catches have been reported.
• Former Senator De Lima cited research suggesting mined areas could subside and become submerged within 30 to 70 years.

7.5 Legislative developments

• House Bill 1843 (reported July 2025): explicitly bans black-sand mining in coastal areas and river deltas. Violations carry 6 to 12 years imprisonment and fines of ₱1 million to ₱10 million. Dredging permit applications would require prior certification by MGB/DENR on "whether black sand is present at the site."
• Supported by Alyansa Tigil Mina (ATM); the group's Jaybee Garganera notes that "DENR lacks the policy, personnel, technical capacity, and budget to regulate black-sand mining."
• 注 Passage remains unconfirmed as of 2026-08-24. EO 122 has not been reported to directly address black sand or illegal mining.

8. 注 Points that are easy to get wrong

1. Don't conflate rare earths with nickel. The Philippines is a critical-minerals country, but that means nickel, cobalt, copper, and gold — not rare earths.
2. Black sand ≠ rare earths. Its main component is magnetite (iron), exported to China's steel industry.
3. "9 million hectares" is prospective area, not reserves. Actual mining-claim area is 787,279 ha (2.62% of national territory).
4. "5th most mineral-rich country in the world" is a claim based on density of occurrence per unit area; no standardized international index confirms it.
5. EO 122 is not a statute. It is an administrative change within the 1995 Mining Act, and a future administration could rescind or amend it.
6. There is no raw-ore export ban in the Philippines. It was deleted from the bill in June 2025; don't equate the country with Indonesia.
7. Writing an optimistic case for rare earths without mentioning the monazite thorium problem will not be credible to practitioners.
8. Final refining of scandium takes place in Japan (Sumitomo Metal Mining, Harima). It cannot simply be cited as "an example of downstream development succeeding in the Philippines."
9. 注 No JORC/NI 43-101-compliant REE resource report can be confirmed as of 2026-08-24. Whenever you see a figure such as "X0,000 tons of resources," always check the reporting standard and who issued it.
10. 注 Figures such as "the Philippine rare earth market is worth $X billion," published by commercial market-research firms, are often demand-side estimates unrelated to actual domestic production.

9. Checkpoints for the next 6–12 months

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