Civil Society and NGOs in the Philippines — History, Lineages, Red-Tagging, and Where Things Stand in 2025–2026

As of 2026-08-30 · Updated 2026-08-30 · Section: Politics, Governance & Judiciary · 日本語版

0. How to read this document (3 points to grasp first)

1. Institutions and history — why there are so many NGOs

1-1. The martial law era (1972–1986) resistance movement as the root

Many of the Philippines' NGOs and civil society groups trace their origins to organizations formed under Marcos-era (Ferdinand E. Marcos) martial law to fill spaces "the government did not occupy — or where the government itself was the perpetrator."

注 A point that trips people up if they don't know it: these are not "NGOs formed after martial law" — they are movements built in an illegal or semi-legal state during martial law itself, which were legalized and institutionalized after 1986. Their origin is fundamentally different from that of a Japanese "NPO hōjin" (nonprofit corporation).

Regarding the scale of harm during martial law, based on RA 10368 (the 2013 Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act), 75,730 claims were submitted to the Human Rights Victims Claims Board (HRVCB) (as of May 2015, cumulative since the Board began operations in 2014) (source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia as its source. Source: Inquirer, "75,730 claims of rights violations under Marcos are being processed," 2015; materials from the Philippine Senate Legislative Reference Bureau. Retrieved 2026-08-27). 注 Note that this is the "number of claims filed," not the "number of recognized victims." At that same point, 31,000 of the 75,730 claims had been processed. This document could not find a primary source for the number recognized or the total compensation awarded — unconfirmed.

The memorial site Bantayog ng mga Bayani (Monument of Heroes, Quezon City) was established shortly after 1986. The names inscribed on its Wall of Remembrance are updated year by year, and as of 2023, 326 names were inscribed (source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia's figure of "332," but Bantayog's own official site gives 326, and the two figures do not match. Source: the official site of the Bantayog ng mga Bayani Foundation, bantayogngmgabayani.org. Retrieved 2026-08-27. Since this document cannot determine which figure is more current, it adopts the official site's 326 and notes the discrepancy with Wikipedia's 332). 13 more names were added in an honoring ceremony on April 9, 2024 (Day of the Heroes).

1-2. "Institutionalization" after 1986

After the 1986 People Power Revolution, civil society was written into the country's institutions.

注 Before claiming a world "first": the claim that "the Philippines has the world's most advanced system for citizen participation" is not tied to any specified index and is treated in this document as unconfirmed. That said, the legal requirement that "one-fourth of the Local Development Council must be allocated to NGOs" is a genuinely unusual system, even by Asian standards.

1-3. The present-day "numbers"

The figures below are those for which a traceable source could be found.

注 Japanese-language articles that frequently state "the Philippines has tens of thousands to over a hundred thousand NGOs" are likely reading the total number of SEC-registered non-stock corporations (which includes alumni associations, neighborhood associations, religious corporations, condominium associations, etc.) as if it were "NGOs." For a realistic sense of the scale of actively operating development NGOs, the orders of magnitude in the table above — CODE-NGO's 1,600 and PCNC's 1,000 — are more accurate.

2. Major NGOs and civil society groups by sector

2-1. Human rights

2-2. Environment

2-3. Development and humanitarian relief

• Caritas Philippines (the social action arm of the CBCP's National Commission on Social Action, Justice and Peace, formerly NASSA): the social-action arm of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP). Carries out disaster response and rural development through a network of diocesan social action centers.
• Philippine Red Cross (PRC): founded April 15, 1947 under RA 95; reaffirmed in 2009 by RA 10072 (the Philippine Red Cross Act) as an "independent, autonomous, non-governmental organization." Operates a nationwide chapter network with six programs including blood services and disaster response. Secretary-General Gwendolyn T. Pang (source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia as its source. Source: Philippine Red Cross official site, redcross.org.ph, "Secretary General" page. Retrieved 2026-08-27). 注 Whether Richard Gordon remains Chairperson as of 2026 is unconfirmed.
• PBSP: the corporate-led development NGO founded in 1970 (as above).

2-4. Labor, farmers, and women

3. The role of Catholic Church organizations

To understand Philippine civil society, one must recognize that the Catholic Church functions as "another nationwide organizational network." With roughly 80% of the population estimated to be Catholic, the Bishops' Conference (CBCP), the Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP), diocesan social action centers (DSACs), and Caritas Philippines together handle everything from disaster response to human rights advocacy.

• AMRSP established TFDP in 1974, which became the core of the documentation effort during martial law.
• Rural Missionaries of the Philippines (RMP): founded August 15, 1969 as AMRSP's missionary partner. Supports farmers, fisherfolk, and indigenous peoples. In August 2022, the Department of Justice filed charges of terrorism financing against RMP under the 2020 Anti-Terrorism Act (which RMP denies). A landmark case of a Church-affiliated organization becoming a target of anti-terrorism law.
• On December 16, 2025, Caritas Philippines and the CBCP's National Commission on Social Action, Justice and Peace issued a pastoral statement on NTF-ELCAC's proposed ₱8.1 billion budget for FY2026. It criticized the practice of distributing development assistance as a "reward" to areas declared "liberated" from insurgency as turning public funds "into an instrument of political patronage," and stated that "peace is not a prize to be given. Peace is the fruit of justice." (Source: Philstar, reported December 18, 2025)
• During the anti-corruption protests of September–November 2025, the CBCP, the Church Leaders Council for National Transformation, and Iglesia ni Cristo (INC, a non-Catholic independent church) each mobilized separately. The INC's rally on November 16, 2025 drew an estimated about 650,000 people, according to the Manila city government (as of 6 p.m. on the first day; more than 16,664 police officers were deployed over the three days of gatherings) (source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia as its source. Sources: Bloomberg, "Church Gathers 650,000 Anti-Graft Protesters in Manila Rally"; NPR; GMA News, 2025-11-16. Retrieved 2026-08-27).

注 The Church is not monolithic. It can present a united front on anti-corruption and anti-red-tagging issues, but on divorce legalization, contraception (the RH Law), and LGBTQ rights, the Church stands directly opposed to civil society groups.

4. The lineage of the left — the ND and SD camps, and their split

4-1. The basic fault line

4-2. The 1992–93 split (one that still shapes today)

In 1992, under the name of its chairperson (Armando Liwanag), the CPP issued the document "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles," launching the Second Great Rectification Movement.

(source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia as its source. Sources: marxists.org, "History Archive for Philippine Socialism" [which includes the original text of "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles"]; Inquirer, "Joma also extends welcome to 'rejectionists'." Retrieved 2026-08-27)

注 A point that trips people up if they don't know it: Japanese-language writing often lumps "the Philippine left" together as one, but the ND and SD lineages, and the RA and RJ factions, have criticized each other harshly. The ND camp criticizes Akbayan as "too close to the government," while Akbayan counters that it is independent of both the CPP and the military. This distinction in lineage matters enormously in practice when choosing reporting or partnership contacts.

4-3. Results of the 2025 midterm elections (a shift in the balance of power)

(source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia as its source. Sources: Philstar, "Comelec releases final party-list ranking 2025 elections," 2025-05-16; Akbayan's official site, akbayan.org.ph, "Akbayan Proclaimed by COMELEC as Top Partylist Winner"; Tribune, "Akbayan tops party-list polls," 2025-05-13. Retrieved 2026-08-27)

2025 can be characterized as the year in which the center of gravity of the left within Congress shifted substantially from the ND lineage to the SD lineage.

4-4. The state of the armed conflict (2025–2026)

• Applications under the amnesty program established by Presidential Proclamation No. 404 of 2023 closed on March 13, 2026, and as of March 14, 2026, applications from former rebels and ex-combatants had reached 16,003 in total (of which 13,633 were tied to the CPP-NPA-NDF) (source replaced and figure updated 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia for a figure of "over 14,000," but more recent primary sources confirmed 16,003 total, of which 13,633 were CPP-NPA-NDF-affiliated. Sources: the official website of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, peace.gov.ph, "16,003 former rebels, ex-combatants apply for amnesty"; PNA, "Amnesty awaits qualified NPA members." Retrieved 2026-08-27).
• President Marcos said in his 2025 State of the Nation Address (SONA) that "there are no longer guerrilla forces in the country," but this claim is disputed (Vera Files reported 146 NPA deaths from January to November 2024).
• The CPP launched its Third Rectification Movement on December 26, 2023.
• On April 19, 2026, a clash with the AFP's 79th Infantry Battalion in Toboso, Negros Occidental left 19 people dead (later known as the "Negros 19" incident, discussed below).

5. Red-tagging and NTF-ELCAC

5-1. What red-tagging is

The act of labeling an individual or organization "communist," "subversive," or "terrorist" regardless of their actual political convictions. It has roots in the Cold War and is used by the military, police, and government officials. The core of the problem is that the labeling itself has functioned as a precursor to killing, arrest, or disappearance.

On May 8, 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that red-tagging (including vilification, labeling, and guilt by association) can constitute "a threat to a person's right to life, liberty, and security" (the Deduro case, based on a 2020 petition by former House Representative Siegfried Deduro) (source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia as its source. Sources: the Philippine Supreme Court's official site, sc.judiciary.gov.ph, "SC: Red-Tagging Threatens Right to Life, Liberty, and Security"; Human Rights Watch, "Philippines: Supreme Court Rejects 'Red-Tagging,'" 2024-05-08. Retrieved 2026-08-27). This ruling was first applied in December 2024, in a damages order in favor of journalist Atom Araullo.

5-2. NTF-ELCAC (National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict)

5-3. 注 The budget figures are confused — read with caution

Multiple news reports give different figures. Even the same term, "the NTF-ELCAC budget," can mean either the BDP alone or the task force as a whole, and can refer to different submission stages (proposal, congressional approval, or actual disbursement).

注 In practice, the safest framing is: "a proposed budget of roughly ₱8.0–8.1 billion for FY2026, more than triple the previous year's allocation, drew opposition from churches and civil society groups." The confirmed amount actually disbursed is unconfirmed in this document.

5-4. Accounting and legal issues

• The Commission on Audit (COA): reported in August 2024 that none of the 885 BDP projects for 2024 had been completed. In May 2024, it flagged ₱154.77 million in BDP spending in Butuan City as "irregular."
• Against Lorraine Badoy: in September 2023, the Ombudsman found her guilty of "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service"; in February 2024, the Supreme Court held her in indirect contempt over the red-tagging of judges and fined her ₱30,000; in December 2024, the Quezon City Regional Trial Court ordered her, together with Jeffrey Celiz, to pay ₱2.08 million in damages to Atom Araullo.
• In February 2024, the Supreme Court, in the abduction case of environmental activists Jonila Castro and Jhed Tamano, granted writs of amparo and habeas data, and issued a protection order barring NTF-ELCAC, the 70th Infantry Battalion, and the Bataan provincial police from coming within 1 km of the victims.
• In February 2025, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 11116, making red-tagging during the campaign period punishable by 1–6 years' imprisonment plus disqualification from holding public office.
• On May 5, 2026, the CHR published the results of its "National Inquiry on Red-Tagging." It found that red-tagging threatens the rights to life, liberty, security, privacy, expression, association, and due process, and recommended abolishing NTF-ELCAC and reviewing anti-terrorism-related laws (Sources: CIVICUS Monitor, updated July 24, 2026; Karapatan statement, May 6, 2026).

5-5. The fight over abolition

As of August 2026, NTF-ELCAC continues to exist.

6. Killings and disappearances of activists, and an international comparison of environmental defenders

6-1. International comparison of killings of environmental defenders, by Global Witness

注 (Reconciled and cross-checked on 2026-08-25. Sources: Global Witness release, September 17, 2025; field document "Indigenous Peoples and Minorities," §6-1.) Within this document cluster, both "7" and "8" circulate as the Philippine figure for 2024 — this is not a contradiction. - 7 = killings (killings) only - 8 = 7 killings + 1 long-term forced disappearance Likewise, the cumulative figures reconcile: 298 = 2012–2023 and 306 = 2012–2024 (298 + 8). Always specify whether a figure means "killings" or "killings plus disappearances," and the end year of any cumulative total. 注 Note also that a phrase like "worst in Asia for 12 straight years" means different things depending on whether it refers to a cumulative or a single-year basis. Also worth confirming: the sharp decline from 17 in 2023 to 7 in 2024.

注 The point most prone to error here: 1. Avoid writing that "the Philippines ranks Nth in the world for the killing of environmental activists." Global Witness does not primarily publish an annual country ranking as its main purpose, and the ranking can swing considerably year to year. What can be said with confidence is that "on a cumulative basis since 2012, and for the single year 2023, it was the worst in Asia" — the global ranking must be checked year by year. 2. The figure fell sharply, from 17 in 2023 to 7 in 2024. Older figures of "17" and "worst in Asia" sometimes still circulate in articles written in 2026, so the year being referred to must always be checked. 3. As of August 25, 2026, Global Witness's latest edition is the one published in September 2025 (covering 2024 data). The report covering 2025 data has not yet been published (it is typically published each September).

6-2. Major incidents in 2025–2026

On enforced disappearances, Karapatan tallied 14 people forcibly disappeared under the Marcos administration (as of January 21, 2026; 注 this is a secondary source and needs verification). The cases of activists James Jazmines and Felix Salaveria Jr., who went missing in Albay Province in August 2024, remained unresolved as of August 2026 (Source: Bulatlat, August 23, 2026).

6-3. International assessment of civic space

• CIVICUS Monitor rates the Philippines "Repressed," with a score of 38/100 (2024 rating, maintained in the December 2025 update). This is a deterioration from "Obstructed" in 2018–19.
• The March 11, 2026 update flagged "ongoing criminalization of protesters"; the July 24, 2026 update focused on "demands for accountability over Negros 19."

7. Labor unions — union density and national centers

7-1. Union density has fallen to "4.7%"

(Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [PSA], "Integrated Survey on Labor and Employment [ISLE]," 2023/2024 editions and others)

注 Beware outdated figures: material such as ILO's Philippines country page still circulates the statement that "around 600 national unions, federation, and enterprise unions represent under 10% of a labor force of 38.8 million," but the PSA's ISLE series shows the figure had fallen to 4.7% by August 2024. "Under 10%" is not technically wrong, but the actual level is now less than half that.

注 Also, this "4.7%" figure uses wage/salary workers as its base; the ratio would be even lower if the base were expanded to the entire employed population, including the self-employed and informal sector. Do not compare figures without noting the difference in base population.

7-2. Major national centers

注 Japanese-language sources sometimes repeat that "the Philippines has long been among the ITUC's 'ten worst countries for workers,'" but this document could not primary-source-confirm the 2025 or 2026 editions of the ITUC Global Rights Index at the time of writing, and treats this as "unconfirmed." Always confirm the relevant year's edition before using it.

Labor issues current as of 2026 include: a stalled bill for a nationwide ₱85 wage increase (Source: Bulatlat, August 21, 2026), and dismissals over union organizing in the BPO industry (the Kyle Enero case, same date), among others.

8. Cooperatives

In the Philippines, cooperatives sit between "civil society" and "economic actor," and play a major role in rural finance, transport, and electrification (electric cooperatives).

注 For cooperative statistics, "the number registered" and "the number of cooperatives actually operating and filing reports" typically diverge widely. Whenever a figure such as "18,000 cooperatives" is used, it should be made explicit that this is a registration-based figure.

9. Volunteering and the culture of giving

9-1. Cultural foundations

• Bayanihan: the practice of neighbors providing unpaid mutual labor. Often cited as the cultural foundation for spontaneous support during disaster response.
• Being a disaster-prone country is itself a mobilizing mechanism: with every typhoon and earthquake, parishes, schools, companies, and hometown associations turn out relief goods and personnel. PBSP's "Ready for School 2026" (June 2026) mobilized 1,048 volunteers (Source: PBSP official material).
• Remittances and in-kind donations from Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) are also a major channel of practical philanthropy.

9-2. 注 International comparison indices require caution

注 The WGI is the average of three self-reported behaviors over the past month — "helped a stranger," "donated money," and "volunteered time" — and it is not a measure of the strength of an institutionalized culture of giving. Headlines like "world's Nth-ranked giving nation" tend to be used without regard for this methodology.

9-3. Institutional framework

• The route from PCNC accreditation → registration as a "donee institution" with the BIR enables full tax deductibility of donations and exemption from donor's tax. The ADB has assessed that "PCNC's certification process is one of the few examples of a government-endorsed NGO certification system anywhere in the world" (Source: a citation of the ADB attributed on PCNC's official site).
• PNVSCA (the Philippine National Volunteer Service Coordinating Agency): a coordinating body under RA 9418 (the Volunteer Act). 注 Its official site could not be accessed, and the number of accredited organizations and similar figures could not be confirmed in this document.

10. The overall situation in 2025–2026 — "repression" and "mass mobilization" proceeding together

10-1. The 2025 anti-corruption protests — an event that showed the breadth of civil society

(source replaced 2026-08-27: the earlier draft had cited Wikipedia as its source. Sources: Bloomberg, "Church Gathers 650,000 Anti-Graft Protesters in Manila Rally"; NPR; GMA News; and Rappler's 2025-09-21 and 2025-11-16 reporting. Retrieved 2026-08-27)

注 (Reconciled at the second round of cross-checking, 2026-08-25. Source: field document "Slums, Housing, and Urban Issues," §7.) Two different figures for the scale of the same flood-control corruption scandal circulate within this document cluster. This is not a contradiction — the two figures count different things.

Do not treat "total spending over 15 years" and "the value of projects under suspicion" as the same figure. 注 Correction as of 2026-08-27: on re-checking the source for the estimate that "more than half was lost to corruption," it turns out to be an estimate of about ₱1.14 trillion (roughly 60% of the total) made by Senator Panfilo Lacson (Source: the East Asia Forum article above, retrieved 2026-08-27) — a specific senator's personal estimate, not anonymous secondary information filtered through Wikipedia. In any case, it remains true that this is not a confirmed finding by the government or an audit body. What is confirmed are the more granular figures cited in the slum/housing field document: 421 ghost projects (October 9, 2025, DPWH Secretary Dizon), 14 cases confirmed by the DOJ (January 2026), and a kickback rate of 30–40%. 注 Also note the currency conversion: ₱1.9 trillion ÷ US$33 billion ≈ ₱57.6/US$1, and ₱545 billion ÷ US$9.2 billion ≈ ₱59.2/US$1 — both are older exchange rates than the August 2026 market rate (₱61.8) (field document "Cost of Living," §1-1).

注 A point to note here: mass mobilization occurring is not the same thing as civic space improving. Over 200 participants in the same protests were arrested, and 97 were charged with sedition and other offenses (§6-2). The first half of 2026 can be summarized as "the streets grew more active, but legal risk also rose."

10-2. Structural challenges facing civil society (2026)

注 (Reconciled through cross-checking, 2026-08-25. Sources: CIVICUS Monitor / field document "Digital, Social Media, and Payments," §2-5.) Two different fine amounts circulate within this document cluster for HB 9465 — "₱500,000 to ₱2 million" and "up to ₱12 million." Since this could not be settled against the primary source (the text of the House-passed bill), both figures are kept, rather than choosing one. 注 Bills of this kind typically have multiple penalty tiers by offense type, so it is quite possible that a base category and an aggravated category coexist within the same bill. Also note that this bill has only passed the House — it is not yet law. It is also a separate matter from SB 191 / SB 1441 / SB 1490, which are under Senate deliberation.

11. Practical checklist

12. Key terminology reference

日本語の詳細版: 分野「社会・生活」「市民社会とNGO」（本サイト日本語版）。