The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People's Army (NPA), and the History of the Insurgency
0. Five Key Points Up Front
| # | Key point |
|---|---|
| 1 | The CPP was re-established on December 26, 1968 at its "Congress of Re-Establishment," and its armed wing, the NPA, was founded on March 29, 1969. In 2026, that makes it 57 years for the CPP, 57 years for the NPA. It is called "Asia's longest-running communist insurgency" on the strength of this continuous duration (注 "the world's longest" depends on the metric — it ranks near the top by duration, but a flat assertion should be avoided) |
| 2 | The prehistory goes back further still. The PKP (the old Communist Party of the Philippines) was founded on November 7, 1930, and the anti-Japanese resistance organization Hukbalahap was founded on March 29, 1942. The NPA chose "March 29" as its founding date to align with the anniversary of the Hukbalahap |
| 3 | Peak strength was an estimated 25,000 in the 1980s. As of 2026, government-side estimates have shrunk to the order of under 1,000 |
| 4 | A joint statement on resuming peace talks was signed in Oslo in November 2023, but as of August 2026 formal negotiations have not resumed |
| 5 | The government has repeatedly declared "the insurgency is over," but armed clashes and deaths continued through 2026 as well. The gap between the government's declarations and the reality on the ground is the central point of contention |
1. Prehistory — The PKP, Hukbalahap, and the HMB (1930–1968)
1.1 Founding of the PKP (1930)
The CPP's own re-establishment document, Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party! (approved at the Congress of Re-Establishment, December 26, 1968), records its own prehistory this way.
"on November 7, 1930, the Communist Party of the Philippines was founded in Manila" (Source: CPP, Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party!, December 26, 1968, Chapter III)
| Item | Content | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Founding date | November 7, 1930, Manila | CPP re-establishment document (1968) |
| Symbolism | Publicly launched to coincide with the 13th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution | Same |
| Central figure | Crisanto Evangelista (labor movement leader) | Same |
| Immediate crackdown | Leaders and members were arrested and imprisoned starting May 1, 1931 | Same |
The CPP itself sums up that being "urban-centered, public, and parliamentarian" invited "political disaster."
1.2 Merger with the Socialist Party (1938)
- On November 7, 1938, the PKP merged with the Socialist Party led by Pedro Abad Santos. CPUSA (US Communist Party) representative James Allen mediated (source: CPP re-establishment document, 1968).
- Leadership of the merged organization: Chairman Evangelista / Vice Chairman Abad Santos / Secretary-General Guillermo Capadocia. The behind-the-scenes secondary leader was Vicente Lava.
1.3 The Hukbalahap (1942–1945)
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| January 1942 | Japanese forces occupy Manila; front-line leadership arrested | CPP re-establishment document (1968) |
| February 6, 1942 | The Central Luzon Bureau Conference decides to form a guerrilla army | Same |
| March 29, 1942 | Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon / People's Army Against Japan) founded at Barrio San Lorenzo, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija | Same |
| 1943 | The Japanese army's "March Raid" (the encirclement of Mt. Arayat) costs many leaders | Same |
| 1943–44 | Vicente Lava adopts a "retreat for defense" policy. Company-size "squadrons" are broken up into units of 3–5 people, effectively halting combat operations | Same |
| Late September 1944 | The Bagumbali conference declares "retreat for defense" a mistake and resumes offensive operations | Same |
注 The Hukbalahap was less the Communist Party's own army than "a broad anti-Japanese guerrilla coalition led by the Communist Party." It was a separate lineage from the US-affiliated guerrillas (the USAFFE line), and its postwar treatment as "irregulars" became the direct spark for the postwar insurgency.
1.4 The Postwar HMB (People's Liberation Army) and Magsaysay
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 1946 | Elected legislators of the Democratic Alliance are expelled from Congress; the Bell Trade Act and the Parity amendment pass. The legal-struggle line collapses | CPP re-establishment document (1968) |
| 1948 | Armed struggle is raised head-on within the party | Same |
| 1948 | The PKP decides to support the rebellion | US Library of Congress, Philippines: A Country Study |
| January 1950 | A Politburo meeting under Jose Lava's leadership adopts the "PB Resolutions," a timetable for seizing power in the cities within two years | CPP re-establishment document (1968) |
| From November 1949 | Armed Huk forces number 11,000–15,000 | US Library of Congress, Philippines: A Country Study |
| — | Renamed to the HMB (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan / People's Liberation Army) | Same / RA 1700, Section 3 |
| 1954 | Commander-in-chief Luis Taruc negotiates amnesty with the Quirino administration. The CPP later denounces this as "surrenderism" | CPP re-establishment document (1968) |
The counterinsurgency campaign was led by then-Defense Secretary, later President, Ramon Magsaysay, in what is regarded as a classic model combining "military suppression + resettlement of surrendered fighters (EDCOR) + cleaner elections." 注 However, this article could not reach primary statistics on the scale and results of the EDCOR resettlement (注 primary source not reached).
1.5 The Anti-Subversion Act (RA 1700, 1957)
| Section | Content (confirmed in the original text) |
|---|---|
| Title | "An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes" (approved June 20, 1957) |
| Section 1 | Cited as the "Anti-Subversion Act" |
| Section 2 | Declares the CPP an "organized conspiracy to overthrow the government" and declares the party and its successor organizations illegal and outlawed |
| Section 3 | Includes in the definition of the CPP "its military arm, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" |
| Section 4 | Penalizes party membership itself. Leaders and armed members could face the death penalty |
Repeal: RA 7636 (approved September 24, 1992) fully repealed RA 1700 (which had been revived by EO 167 and amended by EO 276). 注 Consequently, since 1992, "being a member of the Communist Party" is not, by itself, a crime. This is the single point most often confused with the later terrorist-organization designation discussed below.
2. December 26, 1968 — The CPP's Re-Establishment and the Three-Tier Structure
2.1 The Congress of Re-Establishment and the Maoist Line
The Congress of Re-Establishment was held on December 26, 1968 (Mao Zedong's birthday) and approved two documents.
| Document | Content |
|---|---|
| Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party! | A comprehensive critique of the old PKP leadership's (the Lava brothers, the Taruc brothers) "right-wing opportunism," "military adventurism," and "surrenderism" |
| Program for a People's Democratic Revolution | The party program. Semi-colonial, semi-feudal society theory; the national democratic revolution line |
The heading of Chapter I is "MAO TSETUNG THOUGHT IS OUR GUIDE TO SELF-CRITICISM AND PARTY REBUILDING." It opens by declaring:
"Mao Tsetung Thought is the highest development of Marxism-Leninism in the present world era"
(original text confirmed). This marks the decisive break from the old (Soviet-aligned) PKP.
2.2 Jose Maria Sison (1939–2022)
| Item | Content | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Role | Founding chairman of the CPP. His pen name as a theorist was Amado Guerrero, and later party documents used the name Armando Liwanag | CPP documents |
| Exile | Exiled to the Netherlands from the late 1980s onward, resided in Utrecht | Various news reports |
| Death | Died in the Netherlands around 8:40 pm on December 16, 2022, at age 83 | CPP Central Committee announcement (reported December 17, 2022) |
| Cause of death | Heart failure (per NDFP officials' explanation) | Inquirer.net, December 20, 2022 |
| Government reaction | Defense Department: "the biggest obstacle to peace in the Philippines is gone" | Inquirer.net, December 17, 2022 |
| The party's framing | Even in its December 26, 2024 56th-anniversary statement, the CPP honored him as "Ka Jose Maria Sison, founding chair of the Central Committee" | CPP Central Committee statement, December 26, 2024 |
注 Sison signed documents as CPP Chairman "Armando Liwanag" as far back as 1992, but the CPP has never officially confirmed the two are the same person. Stating flatly that "Sison = Liwanag" should be avoided.
2.3 Founding of the NPA (March 29, 1969)
| Item | Content | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Founding date | March 29, 1969 (56th anniversary in 2025, 57th anniversary in 2026) | CPP Central Committee NPA anniversary statements (2025/2026, March 29) |
| Founding strength | 60 Red fighters, with "nine automatic rifles and 26 poor-quality firearms" | CPP Central Committee statement, March 29, 2026 |
| Symbolism | Set on the same date as the founding of the Hukbalahap (March 29, 1942) | Cross-checked against the CPP re-establishment document (1968) |
2.4 The NDF/NDFP (April 24, 1973) and the Three-Tier Structure
| Tier | Organization | Function |
|---|---|---|
| Political | CPP (December 26, 1968) | The party. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. "Absolutely leads" the whole |
| Military | NPA (March 29, 1969) | The instrument of people's war |
| United front | NDF / NDFP (April 24, 1973, 53rd anniversary in 2026) | The window for external negotiations. Umbrella of allied organizations including Kabataang Makabayan and Christians for National Liberation |
This three-tier structure is what makes peace negotiations complicated. The NDFP sits at the negotiating table, the NPA is the one that can implement a ceasefire, and the CPP Central Committee is the one that sets the line.
3. Expansion Under Martial Law, the 1980s Peak, and Internal Purges
3.1 Expansion
- Marcos's September 1972 declaration of martial law (Proclamation 1081) closed off the space for legal left-wing activity, pushing a mass of students and intellectuals underground and into the mountains. As a result, the NPA expanded rapidly.
- After the People Power Revolution of February 1986, the Corazon Aquino administration released political prisoners, Sison among them (US Library of Congress, Philippines: A Country Study).
3.2 Peak Strength
| Period | Estimate | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 1980s (peak) | Approx. 25,000 | The Diplomat (October 1, 2024) |
| 2018 | 89 guerrilla fronts | The Diplomat (October 1, 2024) |
注 "25,000" is an estimate, not a confirmed figure. Depending on the year and source, figures circulating range from 20,000 to 26,000. When citing this number, always qualify it as "the peak estimate of the 1980s."
3.3 Internal Purges — the "Anti-Spy Operations" of the Mid-1980s
In the mid-1980s, the CPP/NPA carried out large-scale internal witch-hunts and executions out of suspicion that spies had infiltrated its ranks. The most commonly named examples are Kampanyang Ahos (from 1985) in Mindanao, Oplan Missing Link (1988) in Southern Tagalog, and Kampanyang Olympia in Manila-Rizal.
The CPP's own primary-source acknowledgment (important):
"…finally a wild surge of panic like the anti-informer hysteria." "This erroneous current of thought and action has brought about the gravest setbacks and destruction to the Party and the revolutionary movement, first in one major island and subsequently on a nationwide scale." "…which started to become clear in 1984 and extremely devastating from 1985 onward in one major island."
Source: Armando Liwanag (Chairman, CPP Central Committee), Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward, December 26, 1991 (the CPP's 23rd-anniversary statement) original text confirmed
In other words, the fact that a purge (a "hysteria of hunting for informers") took place, and that it caused "the gravest setbacks and destruction" to the party, has been acknowledged by the CPP itself in an official document. "One major island" refers contextually to Mindanao.
| Death toll | Claimant | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Approx. 9,000 | NTF-ELCAC (the government's counterinsurgency task force, May 2019) | 注 A claim from the government side. The primary source underlying this figure could not be reached |
| CPP side | Has not published a specific number | Acknowledged only as a "grave error," as described above |
注 Primary source not reached: A definitive primary source giving the names or number of victims could not be reached for this article. The figure "9,000" is cited as a claim of a government agency and must not be treated as a confirmed figure. Estimates by researchers and victims' groups tend to be an order of magnitude lower.
4. History of the Peace Negotiations (1986–)
4.1 Overall Picture
According to the official FAQ of the government's OPAPRU (Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity):
Since 1986, over 40 rounds of talks have been held under five successive government negotiating panels, and the process has been suspended more than 15 times. (Source: OPAPRU official website, "CPP-NPA-NDF FAQs")
4.2 Major Agreement Documents (signing dates confirmed against original texts)
| Agreement | Date | Content |
|---|---|---|
| The Hague Joint Declaration | September 1, 1992 | The framework principles for negotiation. The "mutually acceptable principles" — a phrase touching on interpretations of state sovereignty — remained a source of friction for years afterward |
| Ground rules agreement for formal talks | February 26, 1995 | Procedural rules |
| JASIG (Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees) | February 24, 1995 | Guarantees "free and unhindered passage" for those involved in the talks |
| Agreement on the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWC) | June 26, 1995 | Signed by: Howard Q. Dee for the GRP / Luis G. Jalandoni for the NDFP |
| JASIG supplemental agreement | June 26, 1996 | — |
| CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law) | March 16, 1998 (The Hague, Netherlands) | The only one of the four substantive agenda items to actually reach signature. (Confirmed in the 2026-08-26 verification pass. The prior version had said "1998 / 注 the exact signing date has not been reached in a primary source." Source: the CARHRIHL original text's witness clause, "this 16th day of March 1998 in The Hague, The Netherlands" (per a PDF compiled by the HD Centre and the text compiled on the NDFP's official website), and the OPAPRU (peace.gov.ph) timeline entry "16 March 1998.") However, note that the effective date is not the signing date: NDFP Chairman Mariano Orosa's approval came on April 10, 1998, and President Estrada's approval came on August 7, 1998; binding force arose only once both had approved it. Do not conflate the signing date, the approval dates, and the effective date. Signatories were Howard Q. Dee (head) plus four others for the GRP, and Luis G. Jalandoni (head) plus four others for the NDFP |
| The Oslo Joint Statement | February 21, 2011 | Under the Aquino III administration |
There are four substantive agenda items: (1) human rights and international humanitarian law (signed as CARHRIHL); (2) socioeconomic reform (CASER); (3) political and constitutional reform; and (4) the cessation of hostilities and disposition of forces. 注 In the 40 years since negotiations began in 1986, only item ① has ever been signed. Items ② onward have never once reached agreement.
4.3 Negotiations and Breakdown Under Duterte (2016–2017)
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| August 17, 2016 | Joint statement by the GPH and NDF negotiating panels |
| August 28, 2016 | Joint statement (Oslo) resuming formal talks |
| January 19–25, 2017 | 3rd round (Rome). A supplemental agreement to the CARHRIHL Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) was signed on January 21 |
| January 26, 2017 | Joint statement on the success of the 3rd round |
| February 7, 2017 | The government issues notice terminating JASIG to the CPP/NPA/NDF |
| April 7, 2017 | Joint statement, 4th round |
| May 27, 2017 | 5th round (opening remarks by Peace Adviser Dureza) |
| November 23, 2017 | Proclamation No. 360, "declaring the termination of peace negotiations with the NDF-CPP-NPA," directing OPAPP to halt all talks |
| December 5, 2017 | Proclamation No. 374, "declaring the CPP-NPA as a designated / identified terrorist organization" under RA 10168 |
The "Whereas" clauses of Proclamation 374 invoke the fact that the US designated the CPP-NPA a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on August 9, 2002 (original text confirmed).
4.4 The November 2023 Oslo Joint Statement and Its Aftermath
| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Signing | November 23, 2023, Oslo (Norway) |
| Publication | November 28, 2023 |
| Core language | "The parties agree to a principled and peaceful resolution of the armed conflict." "Resolving the roots of the armed conflict and ending the armed struggle shall pave the way for the transformation of the CPP-NPA-NDFP." |
| The government's framing | Peace Adviser Galvez: "there should be no preconditions whatsoever, as that could derail future talks." He described it as "not a resumption but a new beginning, a new chapter" |
| Source | OPAPRU official website (article dated December 1, 2023) |
注 Watch for date confusion: The signing date (November 23) differs from the publication date (November 28). Japanese-language sources often write "the joint statement of November 28," but OPAPRU's own article lists the signing date as November 23.
Subsequent developments
| Timing | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| December 4–6, 2023 | Vice President Sara Duterte publicly criticizes it as "a deal with the devil"; Senator Imee Marcos echoes the criticism | Rappler / Inquirer (December 2023) |
| December 2023 | The CPP launches a "rectification movement." It prioritizes internal reorganization over negotiations | CPP Central Committee statement (March 29, 2025) |
| September 2, 2024 | The government says it is "very optimistic" about a final peace agreement within Marcos's term | ABS-CBN (September 2, 2024) |
| October 2024 | Arrest of an NDFP consultative negotiator; a CPP spokesperson says it "could throw cold water on the talks" | Inquirer.net (October 17, 2024) |
| December 26, 2025 | The CPP states there has been "no significant progress" in GRP-NDF talks | CPP 57th-anniversary statement (December 26, 2025) |
| April 22, 2026 | New Peace Adviser Mel Senen S. Sarmiento is installed | OPAPRU (July 31, 2026) |
| August 1, 2026 | OPAPRU: "the door remains open for talks with the CPP-NPA," though the focus has shifted to Localized Peace Engagement (LPE) | Manila Bulletin (August 1, 2026) |
Conclusion as of August 2026: formal negotiations have not resumed. The government's real center of gravity has shifted to "localized peace engagement plus surrender/amnesty" under EO 70.
4.5 Amnesty
| Proclamation | Date | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Proclamation No. 403 | November 22, 2023 | RPMP-RPA-ABB |
| Proclamation No. 404 | November 22, 2023 | CPP-NPA-NDF |
The content of No. 404 (confirmed against the original text): - Covered offenses: rebellion/insurrection, inciting to sedition, illegal assembly, and illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, and explosives for political purposes. - Excluded: terrorism, narcotics, kidnapping for ransom, rape, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. - Requirements: surrender, renunciation of rebel activity, and a sworn written admission of guilt. - Application period: two years from effectivity.
On April 27, 2026, President Marcos was reported to be considering extending the amnesty period (Inquirer.net). On August 1, 2026, it was reported that "safe passage has been granted to former NPA members whose amnesty applications are under review" (Inquirer.net).
5. Anti-Terrorism Law and Terrorist-Organization Designation — The Distinction Between "Designation" and "Proscription"
5.1 RA 11479 (the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020)
Approved on July 3, 2020. It repealed RA 9372 (the 2007 Human Security Act) (original text confirmed).
| Section | Content |
|---|---|
| Section 4 | Defines terrorism (acts intended to cause death or serious injury, large-scale destruction of public facilities, etc., plus intent to "create an atmosphere of fear"). The penalty is life imprisonment without parole. However, "advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action" are excluded, provided they are not intended to cause death or endanger life |
| Section 25 | Designation: the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) automatically adopts the UN Security Council's list, and can also designate domestic and foreign individuals and groups on a finding of "probable cause" |
| Section 26 | Proscription: on a petition from the Department of Justice, a court declares an organization "a terrorist organization and outlawed." Notice and a hearing are required |
| Section 29 | Warrantless detention for 14 calendar days, extendable by a further 10 days |
Designation (Section 25, executive) and proscription (Section 26, judicial) are distinct things. 注 Confusing the two is extremely common in Japanese-language writing on the subject.
5.2 The Constitutional Challenge
- Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578 (consolidated with 36 other petitions), decided December 7, 2021, ponente Justice Carandang.
- Conclusion: the law was ruled largely constitutional (Philippine News Agency, December 9, 2021, "Anti-terror law 'constitutional': Supreme Court"). A motion for reconsideration was definitively denied in April 2022.
- 注 Some provisions were held unconstitutional, but the original text of the dispositive portion (the "WHEREFORE" clause) of the decision could not be reached for this article, so the specific provisions struck down are not stated definitively (注 primary source not reached).
5.3 CPP/NPA's Designation, and the Court's Failed Proscription
| Date | Event | Actor |
|---|---|---|
| August 9, 2002 | Designates the CPP-NPA a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) | United States |
| December 5, 2017 | Proclamation 374 (designation under RA 10168, the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act) | The President |
| December 2020 (ATC Resolution No. 12, reported December 26) | Designates the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization | ATC (RA 11479, Section 25) |
| May 13, 2021 | Designates 19 individuals ("Reds") plus 10 ASG leaders | ATC |
| July 2021 (reported) | Designates the NDF as a terrorist organization | ATC |
| June 2022 | Designates Luis Jalandoni and 10 others | ATC |
| September 21–22, 2022 | Branch 19 of the Manila Regional Trial Court dismisses the Department of Justice's 2018 petition for proscription. The core reasoning was that "rebellion is not terrorism" | The court |
| January 2023 | The Department of Justice decides not to appeal | DOJ |
| April 2024 | Redesignates the CPP-NPA | ATC |
The legal situation as of 2026 is therefore as follows: - Administrative designation (by the ATC) validly exists → it is the basis for asset freezing (AMLC) and prosecution for terrorism financing. - However, no judicial declaration that the CPP-NPA is an "outlawed organization" exists → following the 1992 repeal of RA 1700 by RA 7636, "being a member of the Communist Party" itself remains, to this day, not a crime. - 注 Writing "the Communist Party is illegal in the Philippines" while ignoring this two-tier structure is incorrect.
6. NTF-ELCAC and the Red-Tagging Controversy
6.1 EO 70 (December 4, 2018)
| Item | Content (confirmed in original text) |
|---|---|
| Official title | "INSTITUTIONALIZING THE WHOLE-OF-NATION APPROACH IN ATTAINING INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE, CREATING A NATIONAL TASK FORCE TO END LOCAL COMMUNIST ARMED CONFLICT, AND DIRECTING THE ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL PEACE FRAMEWORK" |
| Section 1 | Institutionalizes the "Whole-of-Nation Approach" as government policy |
| Section 2 | Establishes NTF-ELCAC under the Office of the President (OP) |
| Composition | Chair = the President, Vice Chair = the National Security Adviser. 19 government agencies plus 2 private-sector representatives |
6.2 Budget
| Year | Amount | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Proposed FY2022 | ₱28 billion → cut by the Senate committee to ₱4 billion | GMA Network (November 9, 2021) |
| FY2025 | Barangay Development Program (BDP) funding at its lowest since 2021 | Philstar.com (January 6, 2025) |
| Proposed FY2026 | ₱8.1 billion. Church-affiliated groups have demanded scrutiny | Inquirer.net / Philstar.com (December 17–18, 2025) |
6.3 Red-Tagging Criticism
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| February 2, 2024 | UN Special Rapporteur Irene Khan recommends abolishing NTF-ELCAC; the government refuses |
| May 16, 2024 | President Marcos: "NTF-ELCAC will not be abolished," also denying any history of red-tagging |
| March 26, 2025 | The government (spokesperson Malaya) again refuses to abolish it |
| From December 2025 | Human rights groups such as Karapatan continue to demand NTF-ELCAC's abolition |
6.4 The Supreme Court's Red-Tagging Ruling (Deduro v. Vinoya)
| Item | Content |
|---|---|
| Case name | Siegfred D. Deduro v. Maj. Gen. Eric C. Vinoya (a former Bayan Muna representative) |
| G.R. No. | 254753 |
| Decision date | July 4, 2023 (En Banc, ponente Justice Zalameda) |
| Publication date | May 8, 2024 |
| Holding | "Red-tagging, vilification, labelling, and guilt by association" can constitute a threat to a person's life, liberty, and security, which can justify the issuance of a writ of amparo |
| Reasoning | Actual physical detention is not required. It suffices to link the case to documented killings of other people similarly red-tagged, as proof of a threat |
| Disposition | Partly granted. The lower court's dismissal was reversed, a writ of amparo issued, and the case remanded for summary hearing |
注 Watch for a date mix-up: The decision date was July 4, 2023; it was reported on May 8, 2024. Japanese-language sources often write "the 2024 ruling," but the accurate description is "decided July 4, 2023, publicized May 8, 2024."
7. The Situation as of 2026
7.1 The Shifting Estimates of Strength and Guerrilla Fronts
| Timing | Government-side statement | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 89 guerrilla fronts | The Diplomat (October 2024) |
| November 2022 | Approx. 1,800 firearms | Inquirer.net (November 3, 2022) |
| July 2023 | 1,800 members | Inquirer.net (July 10, 2023) |
| November 30, 2023 | "No active guerrilla fronts remain" | Inquirer.net (November 30, 2023) |
| January 2024 | Zero active, but 11 "weakened fronts" | VERA Files (August 17, 2025) compilation |
| May 2024 | 9 remaining fronts | Same |
| July 22, 2024 | Marcos: "only 7 weakened fronts remain" | Inquirer.net (July 22, 2024) |
| August 2024 | 1,200–2,000 members / 5 weakened fronts | The Diplomat (October 1, 2024) |
| November 9–10, 2024 | 4 weakened fronts, over 1,100 members | GMA Network / Inquirer.net |
| February 14, 2025 | "Down to 1 front," with the AFP shifting focus to external defense | Philippine News Agency |
| July 28, 2025 | Marcos's SONA: "there are no more guerrilla groups in the country" | SONA (via VERA Files) |
| August 2025 | Chief of Staff Brawner: "under 900" / Secretary Año: "about 901, with over 700 firearms" / NTF-ELCAC: "about 785" (as of August 4) | VERA Files (August 17, 2025) |
VERA Files' fact-check (August 17, 2025) rated the "no more guerrilla groups" claim "FALSE (clearly incorrect)." Reasons: - 81 people identified as CPP-NPA members were killed across 18 provinces between January and July 2025. - Fighting also broke out in Masbate the day before the SONA, killing 8. - The military itself acknowledges "785–901 armed members." - 注 The definition of a "dismantled" front is "reduced to 8–10 members or fewer," which does not mean elimination. A standard guerrilla front numbers roughly 100.
7.2 2026 Figures to Date
| Period | Government "neutralized" figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| January 1–21, 2026 | 27 | Philippine News Agency (January 28) |
| Q1 2026 | Approx. 500 | Philippine News Agency (April 1) |
| January 1–May 13, 2026 | 625 | Philippine News Agency (May 13) |
| January–May 2026 | 660 | Philippine News Agency (June 3) |
| January 1–July 9, 2026 | 812 | Philippine News Agency (July 14) |
注 "Neutralized" is a military term combining killed + arrested + surrendered + supporters, and it is not a death toll. Translating it as "wiped out" or "annihilated" in Japanese-language coverage misrepresents the reality.
A comparison against independent monitoring (the University of the Philippines' Third World Studies Center Dahas / Sandatahang Dahas project):
| Period | Content |
|---|---|
| 2025 | 910 state-related violent incidents (390 killed, 520 injured). 175 civilians killed, 145 identified as rebels, 70 on the state side. Police and military were involved in 85% of the killings (332 people) |
| 2025 | NPA members killed by the AFP: 123 (85% of rebel deaths). Government-side personnel killed by the NPA: 16 |
| January 1–July 9, 2026 | Deaths in operations targeting alleged NPA members and supporters: 60 (compare against the military's own figure of "812 neutralized" for the same period) |
| July 2025–June 2026 (Marcos's 4th year) | 419 killings, of which 350 were by state armed personnel. 121 were classified as "communist terrorist group members" |
7.3 Major 2026 Incidents
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| January 1–2, 2026 | New Year's Day clash in Occidental Mindoro; the military defends the operation | Manila Bulletin / PNA |
| March 30, 2026 | "Operation to disrupt NPA anniversary observances" in Occidental Mindoro; one soldier killed | Manila Bulletin |
| April 19–20, 2026 | 19 killed in Negros Occidental (including leaders). NTF-ELCAC states "two of them were American citizens" | Manila Bulletin / Inquirer / Daily Tribune (April 26) |
| April 23, 2026 | GMA reports a list of journalists and students killed or arrested in the same operation → sparking a legitimacy controversy | GMA Network |
| April 24, 2026 | The AFP counters that "it was a legal, intelligence-driven operation" | AFP statement |
| May 17–19, 2026 | A series of clashes in Negros. 5 killed, including a former student leader. The military declares one front "dismantled" | Inquirer / Daily Tribune / Philstar |
| July 21, 2026 | Senior NPA official Nelson "Chubby" Nuyda killed in combat in Albay | Daily Tribune |
| July 27, 2026 | No mention of killing statistics in Marcos's SONA | VERA Files (July 30) |
| July 29–30, 2026 | Continued clashes in Oriental Mindoro and Masbate | ABS-CBN / GMA / Inquirer |
7.4 The CPP's Own 2026 Self-Assessment (Primary Source)
As a summation of the "rectification movement" launched in December 2023, the CPP Central Committee has officially acknowledged its own weakening.
From the NPA's 56th-anniversary statement (March 29, 2025; original text confirmed):
"Much work has to be done to recover lost ground, revitalize the army and the mass base, and regain previous levels of strength." "…the mass base has tended to grow narrow and shallow." "This has resulted in the protracted people's war being stuck in the middle phase of the strategic defensive, for an extended period of time."
At the same time, it disputes the military's claims:
"Top officers of the AFP have made the preposterous claim that the NPA has only one 'weakened guerrilla front' left…"
Regarding the AFP's "Focused, Sustained, Military Operations (FSMO)" since 2017–18, it states that "one to several battalions have been deployed against each guerrilla front, mobilizing tens of thousands of combat troops," and that "in some fronts, FSMO has continued uninterrupted for 7 to 8 years."
The CPP's 57th-anniversary statement (December 26, 2025) says the rectification movement has "entered its third year," claiming the NPA has "recovered and rebuilt former bases and expanded into new areas."
Overall assessment: cross-checking the military's and the CPP's own accounts, the most reasonable synthesis as of 2026 is that the NPA has not been "wiped out," but at a scale of 1/25 or less of its 1980s peak, it remains in prolonged stagnation in the middle phase of the strategic defensive.
8. Differences from the Moro Insurgencies (MILF/MNLF/ASG/BIFF)
| Point | CPP-NPA-NDF | Moro groups (MNLF/MILF) | Extremists (ASG/BIFF) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Goal | Nationwide class revolution (overthrowing a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society) | Autonomy / self-determination for a specific territory (Bangsamoro) | Separatism combined with global-jihadist orientation |
| Territory | Nationwide (Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao) | Western Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago | Basilan, Sulu, Maguindanao, etc. |
| Outcome of negotiations | No comprehensive agreement. Of four agenda items, only ①CARHRIHL (1998) has been signed | A comprehensive agreement was reached. MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement → the 1996 Final Peace Agreement / MILF: the 2014 CAB → the 2018 RA 11054 (the Bangsamoro Organic Law) → establishment of BARMM | Outside the scope of negotiation. Purely a security/counterterrorism matter |
| Disarmament | No track record (only individual surrenders) | 12,145 MILF combatants decommissioned in the first two phases (as of July 2021, with ₱100,000 disbursed per person). Normalization process resumed August 2026 | — |
| Status as of 2026 | Negotiations halted; only localized peace engagement continues | The 38th Peace Implementation Panel meeting held in Davao on August 4, 2026; implementation roadmap talks in Kuala Lumpur September 25. BARMM elections upcoming | Continued target of ongoing military operations |
The biggest difference: because the Moro groups were negotiating over "territory and belonging," a constitutional local-government landing point (BARMM) could be designed. The CPP, by contrast, demands "a change in the character of the state itself," so there is structurally no ground the government can concede. This is the root cause behind "only item ① signed in 40 years and over 40 rounds of talks."
注 Japanese-language sources tend to lump these together as "the Philippines' anti-government forces," but the communist and Moro insurgencies differ completely in goal, legal status, and negotiating framework. Conflating them fundamentally distorts any analysis.
9. A Checklist of Common Errors (注)
| # | 注 Common misstatement | Correct understanding |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | "The Communist Party is illegal in the Philippines" | It was outlawed under RA 1700 in 1957, but repealed by RA 7636 in 1992. Party membership itself is not a crime |
| 2 | "A court has ruled the CPP-NPA a terrorist organization" | The opposite is true. In September 2022 the Manila Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for proscription ("rebellion is not terrorism"). What exists is only an administrative designation by the ATC |
| 3 | "The Oslo Joint Statement was November 28, 2023" | It was signed on November 23; publicized on November 28 (OPAPRU article) |
| 4 | "The red-tagging unconstitutionality ruling was in 2024" | The decision date was July 4, 2023; it was publicized May 8, 2024 |
| 5 | "The insurgency ended in 2025" | A claim made in Marcos's SONA (July 28, 2025). VERA Files rated it FALSE. Fighting continued into 2026 |
| 6 | "The military 'wiped out' XX people" | "Neutralized" is the sum of killed + arrested + surrendered + supporters — not a death toll |
| 7 | "The NPA has 25,000 members" | That is the peak estimate of the 1980s. As of 2026 the figure is three digits |
| 8 | "Sison = Armando Liwanag" | The CPP has never officially confirmed this. A flat assertion should be avoided |
| 9 | "Peace talks have been going on since 2016" | They have been ongoing since 1986, across 40+ rounds under 5 government negotiating panels (per OPAPRU) |
| 10 | "The NDF is a separate organization from the CPP" | The NDFP is a united-front organization led by the CPP. It is the negotiating window, not the party executing a ceasefire |
| 11 | "CARHRIHL is an agreement that took effect in 1998" | Signing = March 16, 1998 (The Hague) / NDFP Chairman's approval = April 10, 1998 / President Estrada's approval = August 7, 1998. Effectivity followed both approvals; the signing date is not the effective date (added in the 2026-08-26 verification pass) |
| 12 | "In 2026, the CPP turns 58 and the NPA turns 58" | As of August 2026, the most recent anniversaries were CPP's 57th (December 26, 2025) / NPA's 57th (March 29, 2026). The CPP reaches its 58th anniversary on December 26, 2026. Note that the party's anniversary runs on a December cycle and the army's on a March cycle, so they do not align |
10. Key Sources
Primary sources - Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act, June 20, 1957) / LawPhil - Republic Act No. 7636 (repealing RA 1700, September 24, 1992) / LawPhil - Republic Act No. 11479 (Anti-Terrorism Act, July 3, 2020) / LawPhil - Republic Act No. 11054 (Bangsamoro Organic Law, 2018) / LawPhil - Executive Order No. 70, s. 2018 (December 4, 2018, establishing NTF-ELCAC) / LawPhil - Proclamation No. 360, s. 2017 (November 23, 2017, terminating peace negotiations) / LawPhil - Proclamation No. 374, s. 2017 (December 5, 2017, designating the CPP-NPA a terrorist organization) / LawPhil - Proclamation Nos. 403 and 404, s. 2023 (November 22, 2023, amnesty) / LawPhil - Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578 (December 7, 2021) / LawPhil - Deduro v. Vinoya, G.R. No. 254753 (July 4, 2023) / LawPhil - CPP, Rectify Errors, Rebuild the Party! (approved December 26, 1968 at the Congress of Re-Establishment) - CPP, Program for a People's Democratic Revolution (December 26, 1968) - Armando Liwanag, Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward (December 26, 1991) - CPP Central Committee: NPA 56th-anniversary statement (March 29, 2025) / NPA 57th-anniversary statement (March 29, 2026) / CPP 56th-anniversary statement (December 26, 2024) / CPP 57th-anniversary statement (December 26, 2025) - OPAPRU (Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity) official website: CPP-NPA-NDF FAQs, list of signed agreements, December 1, 2023 article, July 31 / August 1 / August 7 / August 8 / August 16, 2026 articles
Secondary sources - VERA Files, "Wala nang grupong gerilya sa bansa?" (August 17, 2025) / "Ang mga pagpatay na hindi mabanggit sa SONA ni BBM" (July 30, 2026) / "Intense state-related violence carry over from 2025" (May 2, 2026) - University of the Philippines Third World Studies Center, the Dahas / Sandatahang Dahas project - The Diplomat (October 1, 2024), Philippine News Agency, Inquirer.net, Philstar.com, Rappler, GMA Network, Manila Bulletin, Daily Tribune, ABS-CBN, MindaNews - US Library of Congress (Federal Research Division), Philippines: A Country Study
注 Matters where a primary source could not be reached - A definitive source for the death toll of the 1980s purges ("approx. 9,000" is an NTF-ELCAC claim) - ~~The exact signing date of CARHRIHL (1998)~~ → Resolved in the 2026-08-26 verification pass: March 16, 1998 (The Hague). See §4.2 - The dispositive portion of the Calleja decision (the specific provisions ruled unconstitutional) - Settlement statistics for EDCOR during the Magsaysay era - The G.R. number of the 2025 Supreme Court decision ruling the first impeachment complaint unconstitutional (→ also unreached in this document group's "Presidents and Administrations" article, §6-3)
日本語の詳細版: 分野「政治・治安」「フィリピン共産党(CPP)・新人民軍(NPA)と反乱史」(本サイト日本語版)。