Local Politics and Political Dynasties in the Philippines — Institutions, Data, and the 2026 Anti-Dynasty Bill

As of 2026-08-30 · Updated 2026-08-30 · Section: Politics, Governance & Judiciary · 日本語版

0. Five points to grasp first

注 Claims of global rankings — such as "the Philippines has the world's highest share of political dynasties" — could not be substantiated in this research (unconfirmed). Since there is no unified international standard for what counts as a "dynasty," it is safer to avoid ranking-style statements.

1. The structure and powers of local government (RA 7160)

1.1 The four-tier structure and current numbers

(2026-08-30 source replaced: the earlier draft cited Wikipedia's "Administrative divisions of the Philippines" and "Barangay" articles, in violation of this document group's policy of not using Wikipedia as a source, so it has been removed. Figures are based on the Philippine Standard Geographic Code (PSGC) maintained by the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA); the city count is consistent with the source-replaced PSA POPCEN figure cited elsewhere in this section. 注 The province, municipality, and barangay counts could not be traced to the original PSGC table on psa.gov.ph in this verification pass — primary source not reached.)

注 (Corrected 2026-08-25 through cross-checking) The earlier version's city count of "187 (33 highly urbanized / 5 independent component / 149 component cities)" was incorrect. 149 is not the number of component cities but the total number of cities, broken down as 33 highly urbanized + 5 independent component + 111 component = 149. Source replaced 2026-08-27 (the previous draft cited the English Wikipedia article "List of cities in the Philippines," among others). Source: Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), "Highlights on the Urban Population Based on the 2024 Census of Population (2024 POPCEN)" — as of June 30, 2024, 149 cities (33 highly urbanized, 5 independent component, 111 component) and 1,493 municipalities. Retrieved 2026-08-27. The PCIJ tally in section 3.2 of this document, which uses 149 mayors as its base, is consistent with this total of 149 (whereas the earlier figure of 187 would have contradicted it within this same document).

• Above these sit 18 regions, but a region is, in principle, a "statistical/administrative division," not an elected regional government. The exception is the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BARMM).
• Highly urbanized cities (HUCs) and independent component cities (ICCs) are independent of their province, and their residents do not vote for the provincial governor or provincial council. This creates cases where business permitting and taxation "bypass the province," so confirming the correct jurisdiction is essential before entering a locality.

1.2 The relationship between the executive and the council

• The executive (governor/mayor) holds executive power, while the sanggunian (council) handles ordinances and resolutions. The vice governor/vice mayor chairs the council and votes only to break a tie.
• The executive holds veto power over ordinances passed by the council, which the council can override by a special majority.
• In practice, "the executive is nearly everything." Permitting, business permits (Mayor's Permit), zoning, coordination with local police, disaster response, and budget execution are all concentrated in the executive.
• The President has only "general supervision" over local governments, with no power of direct command. Supervisory functions in practice fall to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).

1.3 Devolved functions

Under Section 17 of RA 7160, health (barangay health stations, municipal health offices), social welfare, agricultural extension, environment/forestry, local infrastructure, waste management, public health, and more were devolved to local governments. 注 "Devolved" does not mean "the national government stepped back." National agencies continue to run parallel programs in the same areas, and duplication of administration and budgets has become a chronic issue (the Mandanas ruling and Executive Order No. 138, discussed below, forced a reckoning with this).

1.4 The barangay — politics at the smallest unit

• Barangay elections are nominally non-partisan. In practice, they function as support organizations for mayors and House members, serving as units of vote mobilization.
• Katarungang Pambarangay (barangay conciliation system): certain civil disputes and minor criminal matters must go through mediation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa (conciliation panel) before they can be brought to court. For Japanese companies, labor issues and neighborhood disputes often begin here in practice.
• The barangay captain is the issuer of barangay clearances — the first gate for business permits.

注 The schedule for the barangay/SK elections has shifted significantly over 2025–2026.

注 In addition, per an Inquirer report dated August 14, 2026, the head of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) has asked Congress to "decide on the treatment of the BSKE by September," leaving the possibility of yet another postponement open. Any plan premised on this schedule requires caution.

2. The 3-term limit and its workarounds

2.1 The rules

Section 43 of RA 7160 states that no one may hold the "same position" for more than "three (3) consecutive terms" (per the text of RA 7160 as posted on LawPhil).

(Added 2026-08-26 upon correction) Barangay and SK official terms are not 3 years but 4 years. This is based on RA 12232, Section 1 ("The term of office of all elected barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials shall be four (4) years."). Its Section 2 sets the next BSKE for "the first Monday of November 2026 (i.e., November 2), and every four years thereafter"; Section 3 sets the assumption-of-office date as "the following December 1 after the election"; and Section 5 provides that "an incumbent barangay official serving a third term in the same post may not run for the same post in the November 2026 election." 注RA 12232 does not amend the text of RA 7160 directly — it operates through the general repeal/amendment clause of Section 8 ("All laws… inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly"), so reading Section 43 of RA 7160 on LawPhil alone will not reveal the 4-year term. This is a classic case of "reading the original enactment text and mistaking it for the current law." Source: original text of RA 12232 on LawPhil, lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2025/ra_12232_2025.html (retrieved 2026-08-26)

2.2 Types of workarounds

(2026-08-30 source hygiene note: this compilation of case law on the 3-term limit previously cited Wikipedia's "Term limits in the Philippines" article as a source; this has been removed. 注 Primary sources for individual cases — the Supreme Court rulings themselves, e.g. on recall-election resets or the treatment of involuntary interruptions — could not be reached in this session; primary source not reached. The figures and case types are retained, but the original ruling should be verified via the Supreme Court E-Library or similar before citing any single case on its own.)

注 On the other hand, it should be noted that case law has generally held that preventive suspension or a temporary stoppage of duty does not count as an "interruption." It is not the case that "taking a leave will always reset the count."

2.3 A 2025–2026 example: Davao City

• Former President Rodrigo Duterte was detained in connection with the ICC (International Criminal Court) on March 11, 2025, but was elected Mayor of Davao City in the May 2025 election. His son, Sebastian ("Baste") Duterte, served as acting mayor.
• He subsequently lost his qualification to assume office for failing to take his oath within the six-month window required under the Local Government Code (per Rappler, "FACT CHECK: Rodrigo Duterte did not take oath as Davao City mayor," and Inquirer, "EXPLAINER: Can jailed Duterte still be Davao City mayor? Here's what the law says" — grounded in Section 11 of the Omnibus Election Code and DILG's position). His trial for crimes against humanity is scheduled to begin on November 30, 2026.
• 注 The fact that "someone in detention can still be elected mayor" is an institutional consequence of the fact that, in the Philippines, a defendant or detainee has the right to run for office prior to a final conviction. This is a case where applying Japanese assumptions leads to a misreading.

3. Empirical data on political dynasties

3.1 Terminology — thin / fat / obese

A classification popularized by Ateneo de Manila University researcher Ronald Mendoza and colleagues.

A central argument of this body of research is that, following the introduction of the 3-term limit, there has been a shift from vertical succession (thin) to simultaneous horizontal holding (fat) — in other words, term limits "fattened" dynasties rather than curbing them.

3.2 The numbers (these vary greatly depending on the definition used)

(A) PCIJ (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism) / May 2025, second-degree-relative standard

PCIJ's definition is "politicians with relatives within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity holding public office."

(PCIJ study, as reported by GMA Network on May 7, 2025)

注 (Added 2026-08-25 through cross-checking) PCIJ's base for district House members is 253, whereas the 20th Congress's institutional number of district seats is 254 (party-list 64 + district 254 = 318 total). PCIJ's tally likely reflects actual seats filled at the time, excluding vacancies. Since the base figures differ from the 254/318 used in this site's "Electoral System" and "Directory of Key Figures — Politics" articles, do not recalculate percentages or make simple comparisons against those figures. Source replaced 2026-08-27 (the earlier draft cited two English Wikipedia entries). Source: the House of Representatives' official site, congress.gov.ph, "House Members – 20th Congress," retrieved 2026-08-27.

(B) The "fat dynasty" series (2026-08-30 source replaced: the earlier draft described these as "figures circulating via Wikipedia and elsewhere"; this has since been confirmed as tallies compiled by a research team led by Dean Ronald Mendoza of the Ateneo School of Government (ASoG), per Rappler's "29% of local posts now occupied by 'fat' political dynasties" and other reports. 注 Primary sources for the individual annual figures — the original ASoG papers themselves — could not be reached in this session.)

注 Do not mix and cite (A) and (B) together. Their definitions differ (second-degree vs. third-degree relatives; whether simultaneous holding only, or succession too, is counted), so figures of 86.6% and 80% coexist for the same category of "provincial governors." When writing "X% of officials" in Japanese-language coverage, always specify whose definition and which survey year is being used.

(C) An example of old figures still in circulation (注)

(D) Signs of change also exist - In the May 2025 unified election, 12 dynasties lost gubernatorial races. Even so, 71 of 82 provinces remain led by political families (PCIJ, May 22, 2025). - In March 2026, PCIJ published a compilation stating that "dynasties and contractors dominate party-list seats in the 20th Congress" — the point being that even the party-list system (originally meant as a marginalized-sector representation mechanism) is increasingly being captured by dynasties.

3.3 Dynasties and poverty

• A 2012 study by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) found lower human development indices and higher deprivation and inequality in dynasty-controlled areas.
• A 2022 study, Political Dynasties, Business, and Poverty in the Philippines, notes that "dynasties are especially likely to persist in poorer provinces."
• 注 This is correlation, not causation. Whether "dynasties cause poverty" or "poverty allows dynasties to persist" remains unsettled even among researchers. Definitive statements should be avoided.

4. Constitution, Article II, Section 26 — 39 years of empty space

Article II, Section 26 (1987): The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

This phrase — "as may be defined by law" — is the crux of the entire issue. Because it has been interpreted as not self-executing, it carries no legal force unless Congress passes a defining law. From the Constitution's effectivity in 1987 through 2026, no implementing law has been enacted for 39 years.

5. House Bill 8389 (passed by the House on June 3, 2026)

5.1 Timeline

5.2 Contents

(Sources: The Star / ASEAN+, June 3, 2026; Manila Bulletin, June 3, 2026; Philstar, June 18, 2026, among others)

A point worth noting as irony: both the Speaker and the Majority Leader who championed the bill are themselves from political dynasties. Sandro Marcos himself publicly stated on June 17, 2026, "I'd be a fool to say I'm not from a dynasty" (per Manila Bulletin).

5.3 Limitations (why it's called "watered down")

Major groups that issued the opposing joint statement (June 17, 2026): the Makati Business Club, the Management Association of the Philippines (MAP), the Financial Executives Institute of the Philippines (FINEX), the Justice Reform Initiative, PPCRV (Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting), the Philippine Institute of Arbitrators, and the Shareholders' Association of the Philippines. The statement described the bill as "not reform, but protection of dynasties, and a guarantee that reform will not happen" (Manila Times, June 17, 2026).

Other developments: the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) endorsed a "White Ribbon March" (June 22, 2026); Ateneo de Manila University issued a university statement (May 8, 2026); a citizens' movement called "Dapat Isa Lang" ("There Should Only Be One") launched in Davao (July 1, 2026, per MindaNews); and a people's-initiative signature campaign is also ongoing (Inquirer, May 8, 2026; signature drives continuing in various areas as of August).

5.4 The Senate and what comes next

• As of June 2026, the Senate version was under second-reading deliberation. Senator Risa Hontiveros (held the first hearing on February 9, 2026), Senator Loren Legarda (SB 1854, February 2026), and Senator Robin Padilla (advocating "the strictest version," June 2026) are among those involved.
• Senate President Vicente Sotto III proposed live-streaming the bicameral conference committee (March 11, 2026).
• Outlook: LEDAC's target is June 2027. The next unified local election is May 2028, and whether the bill will be enacted in time for that election is the practical deadline. 注 Even if enacted, the implementation date and whether it applies retroactively remain the biggest open questions (this research could not confirm definitive information — unconfirmed).

6. Election violence

6.1 The Maguindanao massacre (November 23, 2009)

This incident exposed the worst form of dynastic control — "a private armed group + local police + a captured electoral apparatus" combined. In 2026, an animated documentary about the 58th victim, 58th (directed by Carl Joseph Papa), is scheduled for release.

6.2 The situation in the 2025 unified election (May 12, 2025)

注 The notion that "Philippine elections always mean mass casualties" is a fixed image dating from 2009. The trend is declining, though BARMM and the Cordillera remain notably high — this is the accurate picture as of 2025.

7. Vote buying and barangay mobilization

7.1 The situation in 2025

7.2 The structure of the tactic

1. The barangay holds the list: barangay officials know households' composition and level of hardship, giving them the information needed to know "who to pay how much to move." This is the basis by which ostensibly non-partisan barangay structures become mobilization machinery.
2. Blurring with ayuda (public assistance): disaster and livelihood assistance is handed out in the name of the executive or a legislator. The line between "campaigning" and "government service" is deliberately blurred.
3. Cash → e-cash → in-kind: methods have diversified, including GCash transfers, food packs, and medical assistance subsidies (AICS/AKAP, discussed below).
4. The "sample ballot" method: distributing a list of family-endorsed candidates and having photos taken to confirm compliance has also been reported.

注 For practitioners: during Philippine election periods, strict restrictions (an election ban) apply to new public-works contracts, reassignment of civil servants, and disbursement of public funds. Ahead of the May 2028 unified election, businesses should factor in that permitting and government procurement effectively grind to a halt for a period spanning late 2027 into early 2028.

8. Local government finance — IRA/NTA and the Mandanas ruling

8.1 Basic structure

• RA 7160 guarantees local governments a share of national tax revenue. This has long been known as IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment).
• Automatic release is the principle, and the national government cannot arbitrarily withhold it (though a floor provision applies during extreme fiscal crises).
• Dependence is extremely high. 注 Municipalities derive about 90% of their revenue from IRA, and cities 50–70% (2026-08-30 source replaced: the earlier draft cited Wikipedia's "Internal Revenue Allotment" article as a source. Source: PCIJ, "Stats on the state of the regions: A tricky tug of war for IRA, revenues," and other academic literature on local government finance. 注 Re-verification against primary sources at the individual LGU level [DOF/DBM statistics] was not completed in this session). In other words, the source of a local executive's "budget power" is not local taxation but allocation from the central government.

注 Unconfirmed: The commonly cited tier-level allocation shares (provinces 23%, cities 23%, municipalities 34%, barangays 20%) could not be verified against the primary text of RA 7160, Section 285, in this research. Any use of these figures should be re-verified against the statutory text.

8.2 The Mandanas-Garcia ruling

Political implication: the expansion of NTA has sharply increased local executives' discretionary funds. On the other hand, the cost of functions devolved from the national government (health, welfare, agricultural extension, etc.) also shifts to localities, so the situation is one of "more money, but more responsibility, too." 注 The simplistic reading that "Mandanas made localities rich" is incorrect.

8.3 The connection to dynasties

• Because NTA is allocated based on population and area, the amount barely changes regardless of how capable an executive is. The incentive to "earn budget through performance" is weak, while the political return from "distributing" money is relatively large.
• On the other hand, since automatic allocation reaches down to the barangay level, barangay captains hold their own small budgets — a material foundation for mobilization networks.

9. Pork barrel — the PDAF unconstitutionality ruling and "what came after"

9.1 PDAF (Priority Development Assistance Fund)

9.2 2025–2026: pork survives in a new form

(A) The flood-control scandal (2025–)

This scandal is the single biggest political driver behind the sudden movement on the anti-dynasty bill in 2026. HB 8389 passed amid a chain of events running from corruption scandal → street protest → the "moral recovery" framing pursued by Congress (Speaker Dy, August 24, 2026).

(B) Pork in the form of ayuda (assistance)

• Assistance programs such as AKAP (aid for wage workers) and AICS (assistance to individuals in crisis) are criticized as effectively functioning as legislators' discretionary funds.
• The Commission on Audit (COA) has flagged "campaign-style disbursement and duplicate payments rampant in AICS and AKAP" (per Philstar, December 23, 2025).
• In deliberations over the 2026 budget, some senators refused to sign the bicameral ratification, making the opacity of budget "insertions" a political issue (December 2025).
• The proposed 2027 budget stands at a record ₱7.2 trillion, with the House deliberating under a banner of "continued transparency" (Manila Bulletin, August 11, 2026; deliberations resumed August 24).

注 The idea that "PDAF was ruled unconstitutional, so pork barrel disappeared" is wrong. The reality as of 2026 is that it persists under different names — assistance programs, insertions into infrastructure budgets, and subsidies to local governments.

10. Points Japanese businesspeople commonly get wrong (summary)

11. Glossary of key terms

12. Points to watch going forward (late 2026–2028)

日本語の詳細版: 分野「地方行政・政治」「フィリピンの地方政治と政治王朝」（本サイト日本語版）。