Logistics and Port Operations in the Philippines

As of 2026-09-15 · Updated 2026-09-15 · Section: Economy, Industry & Business · 日本語版

0. Seven points to grasp first

1. The big picture — why Philippine logistics costs so much

The Philippines consists of more than 7,000 islands, so cargo must always cross water somewhere. As a result, all four of the following become cost drivers: ① port/domestic-shipping productivity, ② cargo-handling fees (arrastre/stevedoring), ③ customs clearance, and ④ last-mile delivery.

1.1 National scale of PPA-managed ports (confirmed CY2025, PPA Annual Statistical Report Vol. 1)

Source: Philippine Ports Authority, "2025 Annual Statistical Report Volume 1" (file published August 24, 2026)

1.2 First half of 2026 (preliminary, PPA quarterly statistics)

Source: PPA, "CY 2026 Q2 Quarterly Statistical Report" (file dated August 12, 2026). PPA explicitly notes that CY2026 figures are "preliminary" 注

How to read this: cargo tonnage is roughly flat, while passengers and RORO traffic are up year-on-year. Costs rose due to the Middle East conflict, but PPA statistics show no evidence, as of the first half of 2026, that volumes actually broke down.

2. Port administration — how PPA, CPA, SBMA, MARINA, and BOC divide responsibility

2.1 The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)

PPA acts as both "regulator" and "operator" (running port operations and collecting fees) — a dual role that has long drawn criticism, and one that forms the backdrop for understanding its relationship with private terminal operators (ICTSI, ATI).

2.2 注 Ports PPA does not govern (a key practical caveat)

注 Whenever you see a figure for "the Philippines' container throughput," first check whether it's PPA-only or nationwide. The 8,584,401 TEU figure (CY2025) above is PPA-managed ports only, and does not include Cebu or Subic.

2.3 PPA fees (published figures)

The main published fees on PPA's official site are below. However, the domestic-cargo figures still reflect old baselines such as "as of January 1, 2009," and actual applied rates need to be confirmed per port and per PPA Administrative Order 注

Source: PPA official site, "Charges on Vessel" and "Charges on Cargoes" (accessed August 2026)

Cargo-handling tariffs (arrastre/stevedoring) follow a separate schedule; PPA publishes rate tables that cluster ports into PTMRF Tier 1–3 and non-PTMRF (Luzon/Visayas/Mindanao). In practice, note that the total consists of a three-layer structure: PPA fee + cargo-handler fee + terminal fee.

2.4 The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)

Oversees domestic-vessel registration, safety certification, and freight-rate regulation. During the fuel-price surge in March 2026, it allowed domestic shipping lines to collect fuel surcharges (BusinessWorld, March 10, 2026), and ahead of Holy Week permitted fare increases of up to 20% (Daily Tribune, March 25, 2026). In August 2026, an outage of the Seafarer's Record Book (SRB)/Seafarer Identification Document (SID) system disrupted crew deployment (MARINA official, August 25, 2026).

3. Major ports and operators

3.1 Container throughput ranking (PPA-managed ports, CY2025)

Source: PPA, "2025 Annual Statistical Report Volume 1." 注 Cebu and Subic are not included in this table (separate jurisdictions).

3.2 Metro Manila's three-terminal system (the key to understanding it)

MICT handles foreign trade, NorthPort domestic routes, and South Harbor foreign trade plus cruise ships — each with a distinct role. Lumping them together as "Manila port" is a mistake.

4. ICTSI (International Container Terminal Services, Inc.)

4.1 Company overview

注注ICTSI's terminal count — 32, 33, and 34 all coexist (2026-08-25 verification)

What is confirmed: the country count of 19 (counting the countries listed on the terminal-listing page also gives 19: the Philippines, Indonesia, PNG, Australia, Croatia, South Africa, Poland, Iraq, Georgia, DR Congo, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nigeria, Ecuador, Mexico, Brazil, Honduras, Colombia, and Argentina). 注 What is not confirmed: the terminal count. Even within ICTSI's own site, the numeric block (34) conflicts with the listing (33 entries), and the homepage body text separately states "we operate in 20 countries" — meaning even the country count is inconsistent within the same site. Operating rule: use "19 countries, 32 terminals" (the cluster's confirmed figure) for cross-document references, and when citing the current company website figures, state it as "as of August 2026, ICTSI's official site shows 34 terminals" with source and date attached. Do not delete either figure. 注 "Figures differ by source." The likely reasons for the discrepancy include additions such as Batu Ampar (Indonesia, 2025) and Durban (South Africa, operations began January 2026), and the sale of YICT (China) (ICTSI's 1H2026 release references a "YICT sale charge") — comings and goings that shift the count depending on the point in time.

注 Global ranking

This article's original draft stated "8th in the world by equity-adjusted TEU is unconfirmed," but (2026-08-25 verification) the document cluster does carry a confirmed statement with the indicator attached, so it is revised below to present both.

Therefore, "ICTSI is the world's largest port operator" is incorrect. What can be stated is: ① its self-description as "world's largest independent terminal operator," and ② 8th in the world by equity-adjusted TEU (2024) — and both must always carry the indicator and the year.

4.2 Financial performance (all figures from ICTSI disclosures)

Source: ICTSI, "Annual Report 2025" (published May 2026)

Asia-Pacific region (including 10 Philippine terminals): 7,729,812 TEU in CY2025 (up from 7,107,101 TEU the prior year, +8.8%), or 53.3% of the group total. Regional revenue US$1,336.7 million (+17.2%).

First half of 2026 (1H2026)

Source: ICTSI press release, "ICTSI 1H2026 Recurring Net Income up 25% to US$604.69M" (August 3, 2026). In the 2026-08-25 verification, the original release text was re-obtained and every figure was confirmed to match: volume 6,989,075→8,115,758 TEU, revenue US$1.51bn→1.92bn, EBITDA US$990.54M→1.23bn, recurring net income US$483.84M→604.69M, and capex US$320.05M / full-year plan US$740M. 注 The release explicitly states that the recurring net income of US$604.69 million is adjusted to exclude the charge from the YICT (China) sale. Do not conflate "recurring" with "reported."

In the same release, Chairman Razon attributed the decline in EMEA volume explicitly to "the geopolitical conflict in the Middle East," and stated that the rise in fuel costs was also due to that same conflict. Asia and the Americas grew. In other words, the 2026 Middle East conflict shows up clearly in ICTSI's regional results.

A trade publication (Container Management, August 4, 2026) reported that "new terminals drove the first half, while growth in the existing network was 1%," noting that much of the 16% growth came from new consolidations (Durban, Batu Ampar, etc.).

4.3 Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) — extended through 2063

4.4 List of ICTSI's Philippine domestic terminals (from the 2025 Annual Report)

(Corrected in the 2026-08-25 verification) The breakdown of ICTSI's official "10 Philippine terminals" is the 9 entries in the table above excluding SLCT, plus the Bauan International Port (BIPI). SLCT is under construction and is not listed as an operating terminal in the official listing. BIPI (Bauan, Batangas) is an ICTSI terminal, not ATI's (corresponding to the correction in §5 of this article). SLCT is being developed on this BIPI site. (Source: ICTSI's official Our Terminals page, retrieved 2026-08-25)

注 Foreign-equity restrictions on seaports: under RA 11659 (2022), shipping was removed from the public-utility list, allowing 100% foreign ownership, but port terminals — i.e., seaports — remain subject to the 60-40 rule. This is why ICTSI's domestic port operations always involve Philippine capital in the lead. Do not conflate "shipping" with "seaports" (added in the 2026-08-25 verification; source: field document "Conglomerates and Business Groups," Chapter 7; "Transport Infrastructure in Detail," §3.2).

4.5 2026 financing

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) extended a US$300 million loan to ICTSI (May 20, 2026, Manila), for "expansion and upgrading of three container terminals within the Philippines" and for "green transition." The specific terminals, added capacity, and schedule could not be identified from AIIB's announcement (unconfirmed). Trade publications have reported this as "Project Crane" and linked it to SLCT (Port Strategy and others, 2026).

5. Asian Terminals Inc. (ATI) and Manila South Harbor — the big change of 2026

2026: a sovereign fund's (MIC's) minority stake and delisting (not "nationalization")

注注 (Corrected in the 2026-08-25 verification. Three errors in the original draft were fixed) 1. MIC did not acquire control. What it acquired was an 11.2% (final 11.94%) minority stake and one board seat. ATI's controlling shareholder remains the group led by Eusebio Tanco; the delisting was a transaction to "combine Tanco's side with MIC to reach over 95% of voting rights" — the threshold for voluntary delisting (InsiderPH, February 3, 2026, "Maharlika closes in on first big deal as Tanco's Asian Terminals goes private"). 2. 注 "The seller was DP World (UAE)" is incorrect / unconfirmed. DP World is reported to continue holding part of ATI after the transaction (same source). No primary confirmation was obtained that DP World sold its entire stake. 3. "MIC's CEO Consing" refers to Rafael D. Consing Jr. (President and CEO of MIC, appointed November 24, 2023). 注Not the same person as Ayala Corporation CEO Cezar "Bong" Consing — using the surname alone risks confusing the two (see field document "Conglomerates and Business Groups," §reference).

There has also been critical reporting questioning whether a sovereign fund should use public money to acquire assets from the wealthy (Bilyonaryo, December 18, 2025), making this a political flashpoint. Final confirmation from primary sources (PSE disclosures, official MIC announcements) is still recommended.

Practical impact (post-correction): Manila's two major terminals now sit under a private-sector-led structure — MICT under ICTSI (the Razon group) and South Harbor under the Tanco-led ATI (plus DP World and MIC's 11.94%) — and the loss of quarterly disclosure following delisting is the biggest practical change. It would be incorrect to write that "South Harbor became state-owned." That said, with a state-linked fund now holding a board seat, it differs from the past in that policy interest can now enter into decisions on rates and investment.

6. Other major ports

7. RORO policy and the nautical highway

7.1 How it works

RORO (Roll-on/Roll-off) is a method in which trucks and buses drive directly onto a vessel and cross between islands without unloading cargo. Because cargo isn't handled at the port as with containers, it substantially cuts handling fees and time.

The Strong Republic Nautical Highway (SRNH) is the policy that built this method into the national road network, developing a continuous "road + short ferry crossing" route from Luzon through the Visayas to Mindanao. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) published an initial impact assessment in 2016, "Bridges across Oceans: Initial Impact Assessment of the Philippines Nautical Highway System and Lessons for Southeast Asia."

7.2 Scale (PPA statistics)

7.3 2026 policy debate: hubs grow, surrounding towns fall behind

The Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), in a March 11, 2026 release, noted that RORO revitalizes business at designated hub ports while drawing economic activity away from surrounding municipalities — a two-sided effect (Manila Bulletin, March 20, 2026, "RoRo boosts hubs, hurts nearby towns—PIDS"). The assessment is that RORO policy, meant to disperse regional development, has in practice concentrated it at hubs.

In July 2026, a light-vessel landing station was inaugurated at the Port of Benoni on Camiguin Island (PPA, July 13, 2026), positioned as aimed at "reducing logistics costs in Mindanao" (The Manila Times, July 15, 2026).

7.4 注 A pitfall in RORO statistics

In PPA's RORO table, the Manila/North Luzon region's tally is only 8 vehicles (CY2025). Metro Manila is not the main theater for RORO — it is concentrated on the short routes of southern Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. Do not confuse the "nationwide 13.1 million vehicles" figure with Metro Manila's logistics volume.

8. Domestic shipping and maritime accidents — major incidents of 2026

8.1 January 26, 2026: sinking of the MV Trisha Kerstin 3

注 The death toll shifted substantially depending on when it was reported (18→57). Because older articles' figures continue to circulate, always attach the date when citing.

8.2 Historical background

Philippine domestic shipping has been the scene of some of the world's worst peacetime maritime disasters. The sinking of the MV Doña Paz on December 20, 1987, is called "the world's worst peacetime maritime disaster" (safety4sea, Seatrade Maritime News, and others), and the 1998 sinking of the Princess of the Orient is attributed to navigational error (safety4sea, December 10, 2019).

注 The death toll for the Doña Paz differs substantially between the official record and various estimates, and could not be primarily confirmed in this research (unconfirmed). Always identify the specific source when citing a figure.

8.3 Structural risk factors

• Heavy reliance on old and secondhand vessels, and overcapacity/overloading
• About 20 typhoons a year and cancellations from the southwest monsoon (habagat, June–September) (large-scale cancellations again on August 11 and 18, 2026, in Mimaropa, Bicol, and elsewhere: Inquirer, GMA)
• A lack of coordination between MARINA's certification and PCG's on-site inspections (an issue that resurfaced with 2026's incident)

9. Customs — reform and corruption at the Bureau of Customs (BOC)

9.1 Revenue performance

9.2 Seizures

• Total CY2025 seizures of about ₱62 billion (Inquirer, January 15, 2026)
• 2026: undeclared cigarette seizures at Batangas port ranging ₱235 million–₱1.1 billion; reports that smuggling volume "quadrupled in 2026"
• August 2026: a joint investigation with the LTO over a false declaration involving a Porsche 918 Spyder; disposal of 2,690 reams of cigarettes at Surigao port (BOC official media release)
• August 18–20, 2026: seizure of methamphetamine worth ₱292.4 million hidden in talc from Afghanistan, and goods worth ₱6.29 million hidden in hydraulic equipment from the US (BOC official)

9.3 Corruption and 2026 reforms

注 BOC is one of the most frequently cited government agencies for corruption in the Philippines. In October 2025, the Federation of Philippine Industries (FPI) named it the "most corrupt agency," while expressing hope that digitalization would drive reform (BusinessWorld, October 13, 2025).

Practical implication: digitalization (e-filing, AI-assisted screening) is advancing, but discretion on the ground and informal costs remain. Officials continued to be removed through 2025–2026, so "the system is improving, but operational risk is ongoing" is the fair assessment.

10. Warehousing and cold chain

10.1 Cold chain

10.2 General warehousing and distribution

• A.P. Moller Capital completed acquisition of a 40% stake in AC Logistics (BusinessWorld, July 9, 2026). Nordic capital entering Ayala-affiliated logistics
• Maersk's ₱4.8 billion distribution hub in Laguna (InsiderPH, November 1, 2024)
• Damosa Land expanding its logistics ecosystem at the GMAC hub (InsiderPH, March 12, 2026, Davao)
• DHL opened a new hub in Manila (Manila Bulletin, May 12, 2026)

注 2026-era figures for warehouse rents and vacancy rates could not be confirmed in this research, as no dedicated industrial/logistics sector report could be found on Colliers' and similar public research pages. Where such figures are needed, refer to the paid reports of JLL, Colliers, or Santos Knight Frank.

11. Delivery and last-mile logistics (e-commerce growth)

2026 policy and social issues

• The Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) launched a digital ID for delivery riders (June 23, 2026), aimed at safety and identity verification (GMA, June 24, 2026)
• The delivery boom has become a hotbed for new scams (ABS-CBN, June 25, 2026)
• Calls for fairer labor distribution for e-commerce transport workers (BusinessWorld, June 26, 2026)
• Discussion of EV last-mile delivery (Manila Bulletin, March 13, 2026), spurred by 2026's high fuel prices

注 No official domestic statistics exist for the Philippines' e-commerce GMV or parcel volume. Industry estimates (Momentum Works, Google/Temasek/Bain e-Conomy, and others) circulate, but all are estimates rather than government statistics — treat them accordingly.

12. 2026 shipping costs — the impact of the Middle East conflict

The Middle East conflict that began February 28, 2026, spread through Philippine logistics in the order "fuel" → "freight rates" → "consumer prices."

12.1 Timeline

12.2 How to interpret this

1. The Red Sea/Strait of Hormuz situation affects the Philippines less through "routes to and from the Philippines" than through "European shipping routes and fuel prices." The Philippines' main trading partners are China, Japan, the US, and ASEAN, and routes through the Red Sea carry relatively little weight. What hits directly, therefore, is bunker fuel prices and the global freight-rate increase from capacity tightness on Asia-Europe routes.
2. Domestic shipping feels the pain first. Because domestic vessels have a higher fuel-cost ratio and are slower to pass costs through, service cuts and route cancellations came first, in March 2026 (Cebu, Mimaropa, and elsewhere).
3. The government's move was to hold port fees steady while easing the burden through tolling/port-fee exemptions. However, this has required PPA to revise its own revenue targets, creating fiscal strain.
4. 注 PPA's first-half 2026 cargo statistics were flat (154.0 million tons, about 50% of the full-year 2025 total of 308.2 million tons). "Rates rose, but volumes have not broken down" is the accurate picture as of August 2026.

13. Where the Philippines stands on the Logistics Performance Index (LPI)

注注 Most important caveat

The World Bank fully redesigned the LPI's methodology for the 2025 edition. Per its official site, the focus shifted "from perception to observed outcomes," moving away from surveys to a methodology based on actual per-shipment operational data. The current dataset is "2023-2024," comprising six indicators (maritime connectivity, 97 countries; air connectivity, 167 countries; postal B2B connectivity, 190 countries; container import dwell time, 163 countries; air import dwell time, 135 countries; postal B2B delivery time, 191 countries).

Therefore, "the Philippines ranks 43rd on the LPI" is a 2023-edition figure, not the latest as of 2026. When citing this in materials, state clearly "43rd in the 2023 edition." A simple comparison against the earlier figure (60th in 2018) also doesn't hold, since it spans the methodology change.

注 Reports circulate that "the Philippines rose 3 ranks to 59th in the DHL Global Connectedness Report 2026," but this research could only confirm secondary information relayed through social media posts (needs primary confirmation).

14. Practical checklist (common points of error)

15. Primary source links

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