Philippines-US Relations in Detail — Treaties, Bases, Military, Economy, and People at a Glance

As of 2026-09-08 · Updated 2026-09-08 · Section: Foreign Relations & Security · 日本語版

0. The big picture first

For the Philippines, the United States is its "only treaty ally," and at the same time its "largest export market," "largest source of remittances," "largest destination for emigration," and — as of 2026, having overtaken South Korea — "largest source of visitor arrivals." Looking only at security shows just half of the relationship.

2026 is a milestone year: it marks 80 years since diplomatic relations were established on July 4, and 75 years since the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) was signed on August 30. On the economic side, meanwhile, the underlying premises flipped twice in 2025–2026. The "19%" tariff rate finalized in July 2025 has already lapsed, after the US Supreme Court ruled on February 20, 2026 that tariffs imposed under IEEPA (the International Emergency Economic Powers Act) were unlawful; as of August 2026, the surcharge applied to Philippine goods is the 12.5% rate under Section 301 of the Trade Act. 注Information from summer 2025 claiming "the Philippines faces a 19% tariff" is still circulating in Japanese-language sources, but this is incorrect as of 2026 (see Chapter 4 for details).

1. The treaty framework — three documents stacked on top of each other

The Philippines-US military relationship has a three-layer structure: "MDT (parent treaty) → VFA (status-of-forces agreement) → EDCA (facility use)." The lower two are positioned as "implementing agreements" of the treaty above them, and this structure is what the Philippine Supreme Court's constitutionality ruling turned on (Section 1.3).

1.1 The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, 1951)

• Signed: August 30, 1951, in Washington
• Signatories: for the Philippines, Carlos P. Romulo, Joaquin M. Elizalde, Vicente J. Francisco, and Diosdado Macapagal; for the US, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Tom Connally, and Alexander Wiley (LawPhil, treaty text)
• Registered as UN Treaty Series No. 2315 (registered by the US on October 22, 1953)
• 注 Details on Senate concurrence (Senate Resolution No. 84, May 12, 1952) and the exchange of instruments of ratification (August 27, 1952) rely on secondary sources drawing on the relevant Philippine Senate resolutions. The original primary documents could not be directly confirmed (注 primary source not reached).

Treaty provisions (based on the treaty text as published by LawPhil)

The long-running dispute — does "the Pacific area" include the South China Sea?

• Article 5 lists "metropolitan territory," "island territories in the Pacific," and "armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific," but neither "South China Sea" nor "West Philippine Sea" is mentioned anywhere. This is the source of an ambiguity that has persisted for more than half a century.
• 注 A further point of contention has been whether features like the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal — over which the Philippines claims sovereignty but does not have uncontested effective control — count as "island territories under its jurisdiction." Because the US has maintained neutrality on the sovereignty disputes themselves, this question remains formally unresolved even today.
• 注 Another structural issue is the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes" — the US side has not committed to automatic entry into a conflict. This is why the treaty is often described as "weaker" than Article 5 of the NATO treaty.
• On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, speaking in Manila, said: "As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty." This is regarded as the first time a senior US official publicly and explicitly stated that the treaty applies to the South China Sea (Rappler, Philstar, 2019).
• 注 Then-Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana welcomed the statement while saying the MDT itself needed to be revisited, whereas then-Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. objected, arguing that "ambiguity is the best deterrent." Views within the Philippines itself were split.
• This was formalized in the "Bilateral Defense Guidelines" of May 3, 2023: "An armed attack on Philippine or United States armed forces (including their Coast Guards), aircraft, or public vessels in the Pacific, including anywhere in the South China Sea, would invoke mutual defense commitments under Articles 4 and 5 of the MDT." The guidelines also explicitly stated that threats could arise across "land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace" domains (guideline text as published by the US Department of Defense).
• This settled three points at the political-document level: (1) explicit reference to the South China Sea, (2) explicit reference to the coast guards (the frontline where clashes with the China Coast Guard occur is the coast guard, not the navy), and (3) cross-domain applicability. 注 However, the guidelines are a shared interpretation, not an amendment to the treaty, and their legal force differs in nature from the treaty itself.

1.2 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)

Duterte's notice of termination and its withdrawal:

注 A common misunderstanding — the VFA did not "lapse once." The suspensions and the eventual retraction all happened before the 180-day period elapsed, so the agreement has, in the end, never actually lapsed.

1.3 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA, 2014)

• Signed: April 28, 2014, in Manila, by Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and US Ambassador Philip Goldberg. The same day as President Obama's visit to the Philippines.
• A preamble plus 12 articles. It allows the US military to rotationally deploy to "Agreed Locations," build and operate facilities, and pre-position equipment. Permanent bases are prohibited (a design intended to keep the agreement consistent with Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution).
• Initial term of 10 years, renewed automatically thereafter.
• Constitutionality — Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr. (G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444). The Court ruled 10-4 that EDCA was constitutional on January 12, 2016, and this was affirmed in the resolution on the motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2016. The reasoning: "EDCA is an implementing agreement derived from the MDT and VFA, treaties already concurred in by the Senate; it creates no new international obligations and does not establish foreign military bases, and therefore does not require Senate concurrence." The dissent argued that "it substantially changes national policy and therefore requires Senate concurrence."

The nine EDCA sites (confirmed as of 2023, still nine as of August 2026)

How to read the strategic significance: - Of the four sites added in 2023, three are concentrated in northern Luzon (two in Cagayan, one in Isabela). This has been widely read as a posture oriented toward a possible Taiwan contingency. Santa Ana, home to Naval Base Camilo Osias, sits just south of the Batanes Islands — the Philippine territory closest to Taiwan — commanding the Luzon Strait, the main route through which the Chinese navy passes to reach the Pacific. - Then-Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro explained to the Senate that "Balabac Island and Naval Base Camilo Osias are the most strategic," and officially cited maritime security and protection of interests around the Benham Rise/West Philippine Sea, as well as disaster response, as the rationale (PNA, 2023). - 注 The Philippine Department of National Defense has consistently explained that "the EDCA sites are not US military bases but Philippine military bases, serving logistics and warehousing functions." Even in 2026, Defense Secretary Teodoro has said, "these are Philippine bases, and ones we should be investing in." The framing "nine US military bases were built" is inaccurate. - Budget: as of April 2023, the US side announced it had allocated $82 million to existing sites. For fiscal year 2026, a further $144 million was budgeted for EDCA site development (reported February 2026).

2. The history of the bases — why did US forces leave in 1992?

注 Note: the 1991 Senate rejection and the eruption of Pinatubo are separate events, but because they happened around the same time, the causation is easily muddled. Clark was abandoned because of the eruption; Subic was lost because of the Senate's rejection — that is the accurate way to separate the two.

As a historical irony, when US forces returned under EDCA in 2014, it was not in the form of "bases" but of "Agreed Locations within Philippine military bases" — a design that avoids running afoul of Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution (which bars foreign military bases without a Senate-concurred treaty).

3. Military cooperation today (2024–2026)

3.1 The growing scale of the Balikatan ("shoulder to shoulder") exercises

2026 content: covered the land, sea, air, and cyber domains. Exercises included rapid deployment of HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) and NMESIS (the Marine Corps' anti-ship missile system) to outlying islands via C-130s and landing craft, along with anti-submarine warfare, naval gunfire, and search-and-rescue drills (per an announcement from US Indo-Pacific Command, May 2026).

注 Caution is warranted with the yearly refrain of "the largest ever" — evaluation should look not just at headcount but also the number of participating countries, the breadth of domains covered, and the degree of integrated command and control.

3.2 Money — Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

注 "Authorization" and "appropriation" are different things. The $2.5 billion is merely a ceiling, not an amount that has actually been disbursed.

3.3 Typhon (Mid-Range Capability, MRC) missile system

注 On range: reports range from "480 km" (for configurations other than Tomahawk) to "over 1,000 miles." It varies depending on which missile is loaded, so it should not be described with a single figure.

3.4 The state of play in 2026

注 No new EDCA sites were added in 2026. The number remains at nine, with the focus having shifted to developing the existing sites.

4. Economy — the premises flipped twice in 2025–2026

4.1 Trade volumes

注 Note the discrepancy between mirror statistics — the Philippine side reports "exports to the US of $13.46 billion," while the US side reports "imports from the Philippines of $17.8 billion," a gap of more than $4 billion. This is thought to stem from differences in rules of origin, transshipment (via Hong Kong or Singapore), and the timing of recording. Always make clear which side's figures are being used.

4.2 Tariffs — the "19%" of 2025 no longer exists in 2026

Why the Philippines ended up at 12.5% — USTR applied a 10% rate to economies that "have introduced and are effectively enforcing" a ban on importing goods made with forced labor, and 12.5% to all others. The Philippines was found to have "neither imposed nor effectively enforced" such a ban, and was placed in the 12.5% group. The 10% group includes Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, and the UK (per USTR).

注 An important shift within ASEAN — in 2025, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia were all alike at 19%, but from July 2026 onward, Indonesia and Malaysia are at 10% while the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam sit at 12.5%, opening up a gap with their neighbors.

The 12.5% rate is added on top of the MFN tariff rate, and is exempted for items covered under Section 232 (steel, aluminum, etc.), USMCA-qualifying goods, agricultural products unavailable domestically, and certain manufacturing inputs, among others.

注 The legal status of the July 2025 "agreement" — whether a formally signed and published "Agreement on Reciprocal Trade" (ART) text exists covering the Philippines could not be confirmed (unconfirmed). President Marcos himself said "the details are still being negotiated." With the underlying law (IEEPA) having been ruled unconstitutional, the effectiveness of this "agreement" itself is now unclear.

4.3 The US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)

• The US GSP program lapsed on December 31, 2020, and remains unreauthorized as of August 2026.
• As of 2020, the Philippines was the fifth-largest beneficiary of GSP by value used, at $1.6 billion (the top beneficiaries were Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Cambodia, and the Philippines).
• Philippine goods currently face the standard MFN tariff rate (per the Philippine Department of Trade and Industry's FTA portal).
• Reauthorization remains stalled amid disagreement within the US Congress over revising eligibility criteria such as labor rights, gender equality, human rights, governance, digital trade, and environmental law.
• 注 Past lapses have been followed by retroactive application (refunds), so a refund is possible once the program is reauthorized. However, as of 2026 there is no confirmed outlook for this.

4.4 Investment

注 BSP does not publish "the US's share of total FDI." The country ranking pertains solely to the "equity" component, and excludes intercompany debt, which makes up the bulk of net FDI. Whenever writing "the US is the No. 2 investor in the Philippines," this qualification must always be included.

4.5 Development assistance — effectively wiped out in 2025

• On January 20, 2025, Executive Order 14169 suspended and put under review virtually all US foreign aid.
• In February 2025, the State Department announced cuts affecting over 90% of contracts worldwide, worth about $60 billion.
• On July 1, 2025, as Secretary of State Rubio had stated, USAID ceased operating as the entity implementing foreign aid, and its functions were transferred to the State Department.
• In the Philippines, 30 projects managed by the USAID Philippines office were terminated between January 20 and March 25, 2025 (per a USAID Office of Inspector General, OIG, report). Of about $1.5 million in assets across a sample of 8 projects (IT equipment, vehicles, laboratory equipment), 85% (253 of 297 items) were disposed of via donation.
• According to estimates by the Center for Global Development, the Philippines is one of the countries that suffered cuts of over 95% relative to the scale of its former USAID programs.
• USAID had operated in the Philippines for over 60 years across infrastructure, education, disaster preparedness, and health, and interruptions to HIV treatment programs, among other effects, have been reported.
• 注 However, security assistance (such as FMF) falls into a separate category and has actually increased. It would be a mistake to lump this together as "US support for the Philippines has decreased" overall — development aid collapsed while military aid rose, which is the shape of 2025–2026.
• Separately, over $60 million was announced during President Marcos's July 2025 visit to the US, and $250 million in new health-sector support was announced in September 2025 (CRS IF10250, March 2026).

5. People — the US as the largest destination for emigration

5.1 Filipino Americans

注 "The US is the largest destination for emigration" is correct, but the choice of indicator matters. "Filipino Americans are the largest Asian American group" is incorrect — they rank third. 注 Estimates of overseas Filipino stock from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) have not been updated since 2013 (US 33%, Saudi Arabia 15%, Canada 8%, etc.), and should not be cited as "current" figures. For up-to-date numbers, use US-side statistics (ACS / Department of Homeland Security) instead.

5.2 Filipinos serving in the US military

注 On the cumulative total — estimates such as "about 5,525 by 1958" or "tens of thousands over time" vary widely, and no confirmed total could be found (unconfirmed). Avoid casually stating "◯◯ tens of thousands."

5.3 The veterans' pensions and benefits dispute

注 A common misunderstanding — "Filipino veterans are paid US pensions" is inaccurate. The 1946 law excluded them in principle, and 2009 established only a one-time lump-sum payment. Also, a small number who had received benefits before 2009 (those whose eligibility was established before the 1946 law) continue to receive full benefits even now — the population is layered.

5.4 Remittances

注 An extremely important caution — this "US 39.7%" figure must not be read as "Filipino Americans send four-tenths of all remittances." BSP itself explains that remittances sent via money couriers cannot be broken down by actual country of origin and get recorded under the courier's headquarters country, and that remittance centers abroad often route through correspondent banks located in the US, inflating the apparent US share. A substantial portion of remittances originating in the Middle East may well be recorded as "from the US."

5.5 2026: the US becomes the top source of visitors

Sources: Philippine Department of Tourism (DOT) data, Philstar (June 19, 2026), PIA "DOT highlights tourism investment opportunities as U.S. leads visitor arrivals," and Tribune (June 18, 2026). (Total of 2,741,117 supplemented in a 2026-08-26 verification pass; internally consistent since 531,859 ÷ 2,741,117 = 19.40%)

Follow-up for first-half 2026 (Jan–Jun) (added in the 2026-08-26 verification pass): the US remained No. 1 with 581,565 people (+6.9%), followed by South Korea at 552,860 (−13.7%), China at 219,796 (+64.54%), Australia at 174,257, and Canada at 156,763. Total: 3.16 million (2.9 million foreign nationals plus 260,717 returning Filipinos). Source: DOT (via BusinessMirror, July 20, 2026). This figure is consistent with Section 7-3 of "Aviation and Hotel/Resort Industries." 注 There is an internal inconsistency within the DOT's own series: the Tourism Secretary stated that "from January 1 to June 16, 2026, the US had 591,569 visitors" (per PNA reporting), which would exceed the first-half (through June 30) figure of 581,565. Also, the gap between the Jan–May cumulative of 531,859 and the first-half figure of 581,565 — a June increment of just 49,706 — is far too small compared to the Jan–May monthly average of roughly 106,000. The DOT's figures are eTravel (DICT)-based preliminary numbers, which the DOT itself notes will be finalized once reconciled with Bureau of Immigration (BI) records. Do not mix year-to-date cumulative, monthly, and finalized figures together.

• South Korea long held the top spot, sending over 1 million visitors annually before the pandemic. It retained the top spot for full-year 2025 as well, with 1,346,301 visitors (down 18.5% year-on-year), but in 2026 it was overtaken by the US for the first time on a year-to-date cumulative basis.
• One factor cited for South Korea's decline is a 2025 advisory from the South Korean Embassy in the Philippines, urging citizens to refrain from outdoor activities for security reasons.
• The US surpassed South Korea for three consecutive months before the overall year-to-date reversal, marking the first time it has led on a cumulative basis, in 2026. 注Describing this as "the US overtook South Korea in June 2026" is inaccurate: the reversal is only observable in the January–May year-to-date cumulative figures (announced by the DOT on June 18–19, 2026) — it did not happen as an event within the "month" of June (corrected in the 2026-08-26 verification pass). South Korea's monthly figures fell sharply: 149,964 in January 2026 → 131,535 in February → 91,525 in March → 67,803 in April → 60,962 in May 2026; the reversal is a consequence of this decline.
• Tourism Secretary Dita Angara-Mathay has signaled a policy of strengthening tourism investment and partnerships with US companies and stakeholders.
• 注 A substantial portion of visitors from the US are believed to be Filipino Americans visiting friends and relatives (VFR). "US tourists have increased" should not be oversimplified. The movement of people (Section 5.1) and tourism statistics are linked.

6. 注 Summary of common errors

7. Timeline (key points only)

Sources (principal ones)

Primary sources - Mutual Defense Treaty text: LawPhil Project (lawphil.net/international/treaties/mutdef.html) - Philippines-US Bilateral Defense Guidelines (May 3, 2023): US Department of Defense, media.defense.gov - Executive Order 14326, "Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates": Federal Register, August 6, 2025, document 2025-15010 (govinfo.gov) - USTR final action, "Section 301 Forced Labor Tariffs": Federal Register, July 28, 2026, document 2026-15181 / USTR press release (July 2026) - USTR Philippines country page (2025 trade statistics) - US Army Pacific (USARPAC): announcement of MRC's first deployment (April 2024) - US Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) / US Embassy in Manila: MDB-SEB 2026 (August 2026) - US Congressional Research Service (CRS), In Focus IF10250, "The Philippines," March 4, 2026 edition - Central bank (BSP), remittance and FDI statistics (2025, Q1 2026) - Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), 2025 trade statistics (注 direct access unavailable, via released summary) - USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG): report on asset disposal for terminated Philippine projects (2025) - Supreme Court, Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444 (2016)

Secondary sources - Pew Research Center, "Filipinos in the U.S." (analysis of ACS 2021-23 data) - Rappler, Philstar, BusinessWorld, Inquirer, Philippine News Agency (PNA) - Trade alerts from law firms including Holland & Knight, Skadden, and Alston & Bird (2026) - Ateneo de Manila University, Philippine Studies (article on the 1991 Senate vote)

注 Wikipedia was not used as a source for this article. 注 The following items could not be traced to primary sources: (1) the MDT ratification process (Senate Resolution No. 84 and the 1952 exchange of instruments of ratification), (2) the amending text and expiration date of the 1966 Ramos-Rusk Agreement, (3) the full text of the joint statement from the February 2026 Philippines-US Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, and (4) the PSA's original 2025 trade-statistics tables. All of these remain unreached primary sources.

日本語の詳細版: 分野「外交・安全保障・南シナ海」「対米関係の各論」（本サイト日本語版）。